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Primary Jurisdiction and the Federal
Maritime Commission
By

ROBET Fim

,w*

THE steamship conference system has been the predominant

in-

fluence on national shippmg policy By 1916, steamship lines operating
in the U.S. foreign and domestic trades had formed combinations for
various objectives, the most important of which was to fix rates. After
investigating these shippmg combinations, Congress in 1916 approved
their continued existence, immune from the antitrust laws, but only
under careful governmental scrutiny The result was the Shipping
Act, 1916, which continues to be the basic instrument for the regulation of shipping, both foreign and American, in the U.S. trade.
Antitrust immunity is not lightly bestowed. It is justified in the
shipping industry by the umque and complex nature of ocean
shipping. But it must be administered in a way that will ensure that
the antitrust laws are not invaded any more than necessary to achieve
the regulatory purpose, and must be admimstered by persons of
specialized competence who understand the intricate problems of
the industry and can give their full attention to them. The United
States Shipping Board, a predecessor of the Federal Maritime Commission, was created by the Shipping Act to provide this admnistrative expertise.
The regulation of the shipping industry is not left solely to the
agency, but is shared by court and Commission. The agency operates
within the framework of the act, applying its specialized competence
to an analysis of industry practices, while the court, with its broader
range of experience, works toward a proper integration of the regulatory scheme with overall national policy
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a means to prevent conflicts between court and agency and to utilize the administrative
expertise in aid of the judicial process. Where issues are presented to
the court which, to accomplish these purposes, should be resolved by
the agency, the judicial process is stayed pending referral of such
issues to the admnistrative body After the agency has made its
determination, the court may proceed on the basis of the agency's
findings. The purpose of this article is to consider how the primary
Member, San Francisco and District of Columbia Bars.
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jurisdiction doctrine has been applied in maritime regulatory law to
prevent conflicts between the courts and the Commission and to
promote fair and effective regulation. The most important use of the
doctrine is n the administration of the antitrust exemption granted to
ocean rate-fixing agreements. However, the accommodation between
the antitrust and shipping laws is only one area in which the doctrine
is of importance, and its use will be considered in broader terms,
encompassing wherever court and agency meet.
Before examining the doctrine in its shipping context, the industry
conditions resulting in the Shipping Act will be discussed, followed
by an analysis of the structure of the act. With this background, the
justification for the primary jurisdiction doctrine in shipping regulation becomes clear, and with it an understanding of how the doctrine
is utilized to distribute the regulatory function between the courts
and the Commission.
Investigations of the Conference System
In 1912 the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
under the chairmanship of Representative Joshua Alexander, began an
investigation of shipping combinations in the United States foreign
and domestic trades.- Two years later, the Alexander Committee
issued its report.2 The Committee gathered information from water
and rail carriers, commercial andslippmg organizations and chambers
of commerce. Through the State Department it obtained reports on
rates and operating practices of foreign lines engaged in the U.S.
trade. The Committee also examined testimony and exhibits in the
files of the Justice Department on cases pending against foreign and
1

Anticonpetitive agreements between steamship lines in the American trade existed
as far back as 1868 when the New York representatives of the lines trading between the
U.S. and Europe formed an agreement. Later the lines adopted for their operation the
title of "Conference." Gottheil, Historical Development of Steamship Agreements and
Conferences m the American Foreign Trade, LV ANNALs 73 (1914). Prior to the Alexander investigation the same Congress considered bills directed toward applying the
Sherman Act to the conference system. Complaints of American business interests that
foreign monopolies in the shipping industry were destroying independent competition
stimulated legislative proposals directed against foreign shipping combinations. Subsequently it became apparent that American shipping lines were participating in these
combinations, and legislation was introduced which would have applied the Sherman
Act to both domestic and foreign shipping combinations. These legislative proposals
were unsuccessful, and the efforts to abolish steamship conferences were abandoned.
Zas, A2,ucA

SmPPING Poucy 74-75 (1938).

2 House Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, Report on Steamship Agreements and Affiliations in the American Foreign and Domestic Trade, H.R. Doc. No. 805,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) [hereinafter cited as ALExANPER REPORT].
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domestic carriers for alleged violations of the Sherman Act, and it
studied the report of an investigation conducted in Great Britain
by the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings.3 Two months of hearings
were held in 1913 at which all phases of the transportation industry
were represented. 4 The Report reviewed the conference agreements
existing in the American foreign and domestic trades and the agreements between water and rail carriers, summarized the alleged advantages and disadvantages of shipping combinations, and concluded
with legislative recommendations. The findings and recommendations of the Alexander Committee became the basis for the Shipping
Act, 1916, and are an invaluable guide to the statutory scheme regulating the shipping industry
The Alexander Report-Foundation of Shipping
Regulatory Policy
The entire history of steamship agreements shows that in ocean commerce there is no happy medium between war and peace when several lines engage in the same trade. Most of the numerous agreements
3 The report of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, appointed in 1906, covered

the first detailed investigation of the steamship conference system. The inquiry lasted
three years and resulted in a majority and a minority report. Royal Commission on
Shippmg Rings, Report, Cim. 4668 (1909). The Royal Commission was appointed as
the result of numerous complaints concerning the conference system, principally in the
charging of excessive rates and the use of deferred rebates, under which a shipper became
qualified for a rebate if he patronized conference vessels exclusively for a given period,
but payment was not made unless he continued to use conference vessels for an additional
period. A shipper contemplating the use of non-conference vessels thus faced the prospect
of forfeiting rebates previously earned as well as those for the current period.
The minority believed deferred rebates should be prohibited, and recommended
that conferences file annual reports with Parliament relating to their agreements and
rebate practices. Id. at 95-116. The majority concluded there were definite advantages
in the conference system, primarily in providing regular and frequent sailings, stable
rates and uniform treatment to all shippers using conference vessels. It found checks on
the monopoly power of conferences in the presence of non-conference competition, the
residual competition between conference members in facilities and rates, and in the likelihood of retaliation by shipper associations if abuses continued. It rejected the suggestion to outlaw deferred rebates, believing that the advantages of the conference system
depended upon an effective means of tying shippers to the conference. The majority
recommended that the Board of Trade be authorized to promote settlement of controversies between carriers and shippers by conciliation or, if the parties agreed, by
arbitration. It also recommended that the Board of Trade be authorized to conduct
investigations of the shipping industry if national interests were affected, and that conference agreements and related documents be filed with that agency. Id. at 75-90.
Neither the majority nor the minority concluded that conferences should be outlawed.
Instead, if properly supervised, the competitive restrictions they imposed were felt to be
justified by the service advantages they offered to the shipping public.
4 For details of the Committee's information-gathering process see ALzxAN.in
REPoRT 2-6.
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and conference arrangements discussed in the foregoing report were
the outcome of rate wars, and represent a truce between the contending lines. To terminate existing agreements would necessarily bring
about one of two results: the lines would either engage m rate wars
which would mean the elimination of the weak and the survival of the
strong, or, to avoid a costly struggle, -they would consolidate through
common ownership. Neither result can be prevented by legislation,
and either would mean a monopoly fully as effective, and it is
believed more so, than can exist by virtue of an agreement. Moreover, steamship agreements and conferences are not confined to the
lines engaging m the foreign trade of the United States. They are as
universally used in the foreign trade of other countries as in our own.
The merchants of these countries now enjoy the foregoing advantages of cooperative arrangements, and to restore open and cutthroat
competition among -the lines serving the United States would place
American exporters at a disadvantage in many markets as compared
with their foreign competitors. 5
The Alexander Committee thus expressed the dilemma of reconciling
maritime regulatory policy with that of the antitrust laws. The consequences of applying antitrust principles to the shipping industry to
outlaw shipping combinations would be more harmful to our national
interests than the inequities generated by the conference system
itself. But to permit the system to flourish uninhibited was not acceptable. Some other solution had to be found, and with these considerations m mind, the Committee analyzed the evidence developed
during the two year ivestigation.
The Alexander Committee found it was the almost universal practice for American and foreign carriers operating in the U.S. trade to
regulate competition between themselves by means of written agreements or other arrangements, and that in nearly all of the trade routes
to and from the United States the conference lines had achieved a
virtual monopoly of the liner service. The means used by the conferences to limit competition were fixing or otherwise regulating rates,
apportioning traffic by allotting sailing ports, restricting the frequency
of sailings, limiting the volume of freight which certain lines could
carry and pooling earnings. 6 To meet the competition of nonconference lines, the conferences employed three devices: deferred
rebates, fighting ships,' and a contract/non-contract or dual rate con5 Id. at 416-17.
6 Id. at 415.
7 Fighting ships were vessels supplied by the conference which followed nonconference vessels from port to port, offering space at noncompensatory rates to secure
the traffic. The losses were distributed among the conference members, and the nonconference line inevitably exhausted its resources and retired from the trade.
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tract system under which shippers agreeing to furnish all of their
cargo to conference vessels were granted a contract rate which was
8
less than the non-contract rate offered to other shippers.
The record showed there were definite advantages in the conference system, such as
greater regularity and frequency of service, stability and uniformity
of rates, economy in the cost of service, better distribution of sailings,
maintenance of American and European rates to foreign markets on
a parity, and equal treatment of shippers through the elimination of
secret arrangements and underhanded methods of discrmimation.9
But it was also clear that discriminatory practises were widespread.
The main complaints concerned the monopolistic nature of conferences which was being exploited to throttle independent competition,
the power of the combinations to adjust rates arbitrarily so that except
when a rate war was being waged against independent competition,
the rates charged by conference members were excessive, and the
domination of shippers to such an extent that shippers could not
voice their grievances for fear of retaliation by the conference. The
Alexander Committee concluded that these abuses were inherent in
the conference system and could only be eliminated by effective
Government control. Two options were open to the Committee:
conference agreements could be prohibited and unrestricted competition restored, or the agreements could be continued, subject to Government regulation designed to eliminate the discriminatory practices
found by the Committee. For the reasons expressed in the quotation
which opened this section, 1the Committee concluded that the wiser
course would be the latter.
It was apparent to the Committee that regulation had to take into
account the unique problems of the shipping industry Witnesses
stressed the differences between water and rail transportation. Steamship lines, unlike railroads, are not tied to a definite route and may
go wherever the cargo is most profitable. If one trade becomes lucrative, vessels are drawn to it and it soon becomes overtonnaged. Rate
structures differ between water and rail carriage because rail cars
can be removed when cargo offerings on a rail shipment are limited,
but this is impossible in the steamship industry and when cargo cannot
be developed a vessel must sail with space used and unused. Rate
levels are also affected by tramp vessels not sailing on fixed schedules,
8

Axmwrt1 REPorT 287-92.
9 Id. at 416.
'o Id. at 415-18.
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operating wherever freight is offered and at constantly changing rates.
Moreover, world conditions govern ocean transportation, and the
United States in regulating the rates and practices of foreign-flag
carriers must consider the interests of other governments in the welfare of their nationals."
The Alexander Committee recommended that carriers engaged in
the U.S. foreign trade be placed under the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, 12 and that all agreements and other arrangements, and modifications and cancellations thereof, be filed for approval by the agency, which should be given the authority to cancel
any agreement found to be discriminatory, unfair or detrimental
to United States commerce. The Committee further recommended
that the use of fighting ships and rebates, deferred and otherwise, be
made illegal, discrimination between shippers or ports prohibited, and
that the agency be empowered to investigate complaints concerning
rates, commence proceedings on its own initiative and award reparations where appropriate.' s
The Alexander Committee went much further than the Royal
Commission in the restraints that it recommended be imposed on
conferences. However, the findings of the Committee confirmed those
of the Royal Commission that, because of the advantages inherent in
the conference system, these shipping combinations should not be abolished. Three precepts emerge from the Alexander Report which have
formed the basis for the development of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in shipping regulation-ocean shipping is umque; it is complex;
4
and it requires a limited exemption from the antitrust laws.'
'lId.at 309-10.
12 Congress subsequently found that public opinon seemed to favor creating a new
agency to regulate the shipping industry, rather than adding to the duties and responsibilities of the Interstate Commerce Commission. H.R. REP. No. 659, 64th Cong., Ist Sess.
32 (1916); S. REP. No. 689, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1916). This agency, created by
the Shipping Act, 1916, was the United States Shipping Board.
23 ArzxADE REPORT 419-21.
' 4 The conference system has subsequently been the object of two careful congressional studies. The findings of each of these investigations recognize the unique problems
involved in regulating the shipping industry, and the need for some departure from
traditional antitrust concepts. A three year investigation of antitrust problems in the
shipping industry was conducted by the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary under the chairmanship of Representative Emanuel Celler, resulting in
the report of the STAFF or HousE Comm. ON THE JuniciAy, 87TH CONG., 2D Siss.,
REPO T oN THE OcFAN FnmoT INDusTmY (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter cited as
CErn REPORT]. The Celler Committee acknowledged that it "recognizes the unique
character of the ocean slhpping industry with respect to the application of the antitrust
laws. No other governments inhibit their carriers by antitrust laws, and American ocean
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The Alexander Committee's recommendations were not implemented until two years later when, on September 7, 1916, with the
Alexander Report as its guide, the Shipping Act, 1916,15 was enacted.
The Shipping Act has since then set the pattern for the regulation of
the shipping industry
The Shipping Act, 1916-A Comprehensive
Regulatory Scheme
The most important provision of the Shipping Act is section 15,16
which grants an express immunity from the antitrust laws. Section 15
requires that every common carrier and other person subject to the
act file wth the Federal Maritime Commission 7 every agreement, or
any modification or cancellation thereof, which fixes or regulates
transportation rates; grants special rates, accommodations, or other
privileges; regulates or destroys competition; pools or apportions earnings, losses, or traffic; allots ports or regulates sailings; regulates the
volume of freight or passenger traffic; or in any manner provides for
an exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangement. The
Commission is required to disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously
approved, that it finds unjustly discriminatory, detrimental to the U.S.
commerce, contrary to the public interest, or in violation of the Shipping Act. Approved agreements are lawful and are exempt from the
antitrust laws.18 Section 15 further provides that persons violating any
carriers must compete, not within the framework of our domestic antitrust laws, but
in the ]ungle world of ocean shipping cartels." Id. at 382.
The second conference investigation resulted in Pub. L. No. 87-346 (approved
October 3, 1961), 75 Stat. 762 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1964), which clarified the
status of conference exclusive patronage or dual rate agreements, which were of doubtful
legality after Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958). For a
discussion of the Isbrandtsencase see text accompanying notes 113-122 %nfra.The House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries wich considered the proposed dual rate
legislation, reaffirmed the importance of continuing the conference system, and, like the
Alexander and Celler Committees, concluded that the industry required some exemption
from the antitrust laws. H.R. Bip. No. 498, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1961).
1539 Stat. 728 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1964).
16 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
17
As the result of organizational changes, five successive agencies have shared in
the regulation of the shipping industry- The United States Sipping Board, 1917-1933;
the United States Sipping Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce, 1933-1936;
the United States Maritime Commission, 1936-1950; the Federal Maritime Board, 19501961, and the Federal Maritime Commission.
18 "Any agreement and any modification or cancellation of any agreement not approved, or disapproved, by the Commission shall be unlawful, and agreements, modifications, and cancellations shall be lawful only when and as long as approved by the
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of its provisions shall be liable to a penalty, to be recovered by the
United States in a civil action.
Section 1419 of the act outlaws the two major predatory devices
previously utilized by conferences: deferred rebates and fighting ships.
It also prohibits retaliation and other discriminatory devices practiced against shippers. Violations of section 14 are misdemeanors.
Section 14a2° places upon the Commission the duty of determining
whether a foreign carrier has violated section 14, or is a party to any
combination or agreement covering transportation between foreign
ports that involves practices enumerated in section 14, and excludes
United States common carriers from admission. If the Commission
makes such findings, it must certify them to the Commissioner of
Customs, who is required to close United States ports to such carrier.
Section 14b, added in 1961,21 authorizes the use of dual rate contracts by any common carrier or conference of carriers in foreign
commerce when approved by the Commission pursuant to certain
specified standards. Approved dual rate contracts are immune from
the antitrust laws under section 15.
Carriers, shippers, consignees and other persons are prohibited by
section 1622 from knowingly, by means of false billing or other unjust
or unfair devices, granting or obtaining transportation at less than
the applicable rates. The section also forbids common carriers and
other persons subject to the act from unduly or unreasonably preferring or prejudicing any particular person, locality or description of
traffic, or from inducing any marine insurer to discriminate against
a competing carrier. Violations of section 16 are misdemeanors punishable by a fine. Section 1723 prohibits common carriers in foreign
commerce from charging rates which are unjustly discriminatory
between shippers or ports, or unjustly prejudicial to United States
exporters as compared with their foreign competitors, and requires
the Commission to order the discontinuance of such practices wherever
Commission; before approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry out in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement, modification, or cancellation
"Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section, or permitted under section 813a of this title [dual rate agreements], shall be excepted from
the provisions of sections 1-11 and 15 of Title 15, and amendments and Acts supplementary thereto." 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
19 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1964).
2041 Stat. 996 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 813 (1964).
21 Pub. L. No. 87-346, 75 Stat. 762 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1964).
2239 Stat. 734 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1964).
23 39 Stat. 734 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 816 (1964).
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it finds they exist. Section 17 also requires every carrier in foreign
commerce and other person subject to the act, to establish and observe
just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to the receiving,
handling and delivering of property, and upon a finding by the
Commission that such regulations or practices exist, it may prescribe
and enforce just and reasonable practices related to those services.
Section 1824 originally required only common carriers in interstate
commerce to establish just and reasonable rates, regulations and
practices, to file tariffs with the Commission and to refrain from
charging rates exceeding those of their tariffs. In 1961, section 18 was
amended, requiring common carriers in foreign commerce and conferences of such carriers to file tariffs with the Commission and forbidding any new rates or increases in rates on less than thirty days'
notice, except with special permission of the Commission. By the 1961
amendment, conferences and carriers in foreign commerce were
prohibited from charging rates other than those specified in their
tariffs filed with the Commission. Section 18 also requires the Commission to disapprove rates of conferences or common carriers in
foreign commerce, which are so unreasonably high or low as to be
detrimental to U.S. commerce. A violation of section 18 is subject to
a penalty, to be recovered by the United States in a civil action.
Section 1925 forbids common carriers in interstate commerce, who
have reduced their rates to noncompensatory levels to injure a competitive carrier, from increasing their rates prior to obtaining approval
from the Commssion. Section 2026 makes it unlawful for any common
carrier or other person subject to the act to disclose or receive mformation concerning property delivered to them, which may be used to
the detriment of the shipper or consignee of the cargo or of any
carrier. Under section 21,27 the Commission may require any common
carrier or other person subject to the act to file reports relating to
their business, and the failure to do so results in a $100 forfeiture to
the United States for each day of default. The falsifying of such reports is a misdemeanor.
The Commission is given reparation powers under section 22,28
which permits any person to file a complaint with the Commission
charging a violation of the act by a common carrier or other person
2439 Stat. 735 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 817 (Supp. I, 1965).
2539 Stat. 735 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 818 (1964).
2639 Stat. 735 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
2739
28 39

Stat. 736 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).
Stat. 736 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 821 (1964).
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subject to the act. If the complaint is filed within two years after the
cause of action accrues, the Commission may award reparations
for any injury caused by such violations. Under section 22 the Commission may also investigate any violation of the act on its own initiative. By section 29,29 any violation of a Commission order, other than
an order for the payment of money, is subject to injunction or other
process of any federal district court having jurisdiction of the parties,
at the suit of the Commission, the Attorney General or any party injured by such violation. Section 3030 covers the enforcement of orders
of the Commission for the payment of money, and provides that in
case of violation of any such order, the person to whom the award was
made may obtain relief from a federal district court, and in such
proceeding the findings and order of the Comnssion shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Such enforcement
actions must be brought within one year from the date of the Commission's order.
Section 3231 states that a violation of the act, except where a
different penalty is provided, is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not to exceed $5,000. Section 44,32 added in 1961, governs ocean
freight forwarders, and prohibits any person from engaging in the
ocean freight forwarding business unless licensed by the Commission
pursuant to certain statutory standards.
A study of the Shipping Act shows the broad range of persons
covered by its provisions, including common earners, independent
ocean freight forwarders, and all persons carrying on the business of
furnishing wharfage, warehouse or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water. The shipping practices it
governs are as comprehensive as they are diverse. Some of these
practices are immune from the antitrust laws. In many instances the
standards of unlawful conduct have been purposely drawn in only
general terms. Such factors are-important to the primary jurisdiction
question since they suggest the extent to which the agency's powers
should be invoked in aid of judicial proceedings.
This review of the Shipping Act and the industry conditions leading to its enactment provides a background for the discussion of
the development of the primary jurisdiction doctrine and its application to maritime regulation.
2939

Stat. 737 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 828 (1964).

3039 Stat. 737 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 829 (1964).

3139 Stat. 738 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).
32 Pub. L. No. 87-254, 75 Stat. 522 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 841b (1964).
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The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction in Other
Regulated Industries
General Principles and Application of Doctrine
in Non-Antitrust Cases
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a means by which specialized administrative knowledge is utilized to reach a better-informed
judicial result, and to prevent court interference with agency jurisdiction.
applies where a claim is originally cogm"Primary jurisdiction"
zable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
clain requires -the resolution of issues winch, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within -the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended
pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
83
views.

The jurisdiction of the court is therefore not ousted, but only postponed.34 On completion of the agency's task the court proceeds with
its adjudication of the controversy, equipped with the administrative
analysis of the referred issues. By this process the court and the
agency, each operating within its sphere, work together in the
common regulatory purpose.
The primary jurisdiction doctrine originated in Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.3" The plaintiff alleged that the rate charged
by the defendant railway company for carrying the plaintiff's goods
was unreasonably high, discrimmatory and unduly prejudicial. The
rate charged was that applicable under defendant's tariff which was
published and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, as
required by the Interstate Commerce Act. 6 The court concluded that
a shipper seeking reparations for allegedly unreasonable rates must
"under the act to regulate commerce, primarily invoke redress through
the Interstate Commerce Commission, which body alone is vested
with power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration
of an established schedule, because the rates fixed therein are unreasonable."8 7 The danger in permitting ]udicial relief without prior
reference to the Commission was that if a shipper obtained relief from
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963).
85 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
3624 Stat. 379 (1887) (amended by 49 Stat. 543 (1935)), 54 Stat. 929 (1940),
56 Stat 284 (1942), 72 Stat. 568 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, 301-327, 901923, 1001-1022, 1231-1240 (1964).
37 204 U.S. at 448.
33

34
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a court upon a finding that the established rate was unreasonable, he
would thereby be given a preference over all other shippers who
would not be affected by the court's order and would continue to pay
the established rate. The Court was also concerned that if courts were
empowered to determine the reasonableness of an established rate,
no regulatory uniformity would be possible because of the potentially
different judicial conclusions as to what rate is reasonable. If the
determination of the reasonableness of the rate were left to the
Commission, the agency could, on a finding that the rate is unreasonable, award reparations to the shipper, and also order the filing of
new rates applicable to all.
The purpose of invoking agency jurisdiction in the Abilene case
was to achieve the uniformity required by the Interstate Commerce
Act. There is, however, no single rule for the application of the doctrine. In the earlier cases decided after Abilene, the need for urnformity was stressed. 8 Another criterion used is to distinguish between "controversies which involve only questions of law and those
which involve issues essentially of fact, or call for the exercise of
administrative discretion." 9 More recently the specialized knowledge
of the agency involved has been emphasized. 0
Except in controversies arising under the antitrust laws, a subject
to be considered later, the primary jurisdiction doctrine has been
fashioned largely from Interstate Commerce Act cases, particularly
those involving the railroad industry A study of these cases is helpful
not only because it facilitates an understanding of how the doctrine
applies in varying circumstances, but it also suggests appropriate
solutions in cases arising under the Shipping Act which in its terms
and operation closely parallels the Interstate Commerce Act.4'
The doctrine is applicable to proceedings brought to enforce the
criminal provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, as well as to
civil actions.42 The act is more regulatory and administrative than
38 Keogh v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922); Mitchell Coal & Coke
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1913); Robinson v. Baltimore & O.R.L,
222 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1912).
39 Great No. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 295-96 (1922).
40
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
41 United States Nav. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 481 (1932). See text
accompanying notes 99-104 mfra, for a discussion of the Cunard case.
42
United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106-08 (1913).
This was an indictment for alleged violations of the Sherman and Interstate Commerce
Acts. Defendants were rail carrers, steamship lines and a wharfinger who allegedly conspired to eliminate and destroy competition between the United States, the Territory of
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criminal, and while the violation of some of its provisions constitutes
criminal conduct, the determination of whether there has been a
violation may involve administrative questions. In such cases the
purposes of the act are better served by withholding judicial proceed-

ings in crimmal and civil
cases until the conduct has been passed upon
43
by the Commission.

Controversies involving the interpretation of a carner's tariff fall into
two categories. If the words in issue are used in their ordinary sense,
the solution requires only construction rather than the exercise of
admmistrative discretion, and the primary jurisdiction doctrine is
inapplicable.44 If, however, the terms are used in a peculiar or
technical sense and their proper meaning requires an analysis of
extrinsic facts within the specialized knowledge of the agency, the
doctrine requires that the controversy be referred to the Commission. 45 Where the agency has already construed the tariff provision
in question, 46 or has clarified the factors underlying it,47 there is
no need to refer the controversy to the agency, and the doctrine is
inapplicable.
The determination of whether rates are unreasonable,48 or unjustly
discriminatory, 49 are matters within the specialized competence of
the agency The primary jurisdiction doctrine also applies to questions
of the reasonableness of tariff commodity classifications,5 a carrier's
routing practices,5i the determination of the terms and conditions
under which trackage rights may be acquired and abandoned,5 2 and
Alaska and British Columbia. The district court held it was without jurisdiction to
determine the controversy until issues involving the discriminatory acts of the defendants
had been passed on by the Interstate Commerce Commission, on the authority of the
Abilene case. This decision was reversed as to the Sherman Act counts, see text accompanying note 94 infra, but was afrmed as to the counts alleging violations of the
criminal provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.
43 Id. at 107.
44
Great No. By. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 294 (1922); St. Louis,
I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Hasty & Sons, 255 U.S. 252, 256 (1921).
45
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 66, 69 (1956); Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 234 U.S. 138, 147 (1914).
46 Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U.S. 631, 634-35 (1942).
47 See United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 69 (1956).
48
Texas & Pac. By. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907).
4
9Board of R.R. Comm'rs v. Great No. Ry., 281 U.S. 412, 424 (1930); Keogh v.
Chicago & N.W Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1922); Robinson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 222
U.S. 506, 511 (1912).
50
Director Gen. of R.R. v. Viscose Co., 254 U.S. 498, 503 (1921).
51 Hewitt-Robms, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 87 (1962);
Northern Pac. By. v. Solum, 247 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1918).
52 Thomson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1946).
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the determination of whether the discrimination in the particular
application of a tariff provision is unreasonable. 5'
The question of whether a carrier's tariff rule is unfair, unreasonable or otherwise unlawful, is administrative in character and requires
the specialized knowledge of the Commission. " But where a tariff
rule, fair on its face, is applied unequally, or unfairly, a person injured
thereby may recover damages, and no reference to the Commission is
necessary 55 And where, under the circumstances of the case, the
tariff rule is inapplicable to the controversy, no primary jurisdiction
questions are involved.56
The charging of non-tariff rates, 57 and the payment of rebates,5 8
practices clearly unlawful, are not matters involving administrative
discretion, and fall outside the scope of the doctrine.
When the doctrine is applied and the controversy referred to the
agency, the appropriate action is to stay the judicial proceedings, not
to dismiss them. 9 But where the relief requested can be granted only
by the agency,60 or where the period of limitations for the filing of
complaints with the administrative body expired prior to the mstitution of the judicial proceedings, 61 no purpose is served in continuing
the suit and a dismissal is appropriate.
St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Brownsville Nay. Dist., 304 U.S. 295, 301 (1938).
Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 42122 (1959); General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 43132 (1940); Midland Valley R.R. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482, 484-85 (1928); Morrisdale
Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 304, 314 (1913); Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1913); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States
ex rel. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S. 481, 498 (1910); ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S.
452, 477-78 (1910).
55
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co., 238 U.S. 275, 281-83 (1915); Pennsylvama R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1915). Cf. St. Louis,
B. & M. Ry. v. Brownsville Nav. Dist., 304 U.S. 295, 301 (1938), which held that when
the question is whether the discrimmation in the application of the tariff is "unreasonable," the controversy is administrative in nature.
56 Pennsylvaa R.R. v. Soninan Shaft Coal Co., 242 U.S. 120, 126 (1916); see
Eastern Ry. v. Littlefield, 237 U.S. 140 (1915).
57Pennsylvama R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1913).
58 Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 247, 260-61 (1913).
59Id. at 266-67; Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 151 (1946); General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 433 (1940).
60 See St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Brownsville Nay. Dist., 304 U.S. 295, 301 (1938).
In Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 253 (1951),
the Court said: "In no instance have we directed a court to retain a case in which it
could not determine a single one of its vital issues."
61 Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1913). In
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72-73 (1956), however, it was held
that the expiration of the regulatory period of limitations does not bar reference to the
agency of questions raised solely by way of defense and within the agency's primary
jurisdiction.
53

54
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Primary Jurisdiction and the Antitrust Laws
In antitrust proceedings involving the regulated industries the
courts must decide whether the regulatory statute protects the disputed activities from the antitrust laws expressly or by implication.
If the regulatory statute expressly immunizes the conduct, the antitrust laws are superseded to the extent of any such immunity Even
though the activity is not specifically exempt, the statutory scheme
may reflect a clear legislative intent to supersede the antitrust laws
as to that activity The result is a pro tanto repeal of the antitrust
laws by implication. When the court determines that the regulatory
statute has superseded the antitrust laws as to the specific acts charged,
its jurisdiction is thereby ousted. The issue is solely whether the acts
are governed by the regulatory or the antitrust laws. If it is the regulatory statute that applies, the agency has exclusive jurisdiction, sub]ect to judicial review, and that ends the matter.
Repeals, express or implied, should be distinguished from the
result achieved where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable. The regulatory scheme may require that some initial determnation be made by the agency before antitrust remedies are invoked.
Where there are such matters for the special competence of the
administrative agency, judicial proceedings are stayed pending the
agency's findings. The immediate result is to defer, rather than displace, the antitrust remedy In some instances the conduct, viewed in
the light of the agency's findings, may qualify for antitrust immunity
under the regulatory statute. The application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine may thus be preliminary to a finding that the antitrust
laws have been superseded.
In the non-maritime antitrust cases, pro tanto repeal has played
the prominent role in the accommodation between the regulatory
and antitrust laws. Instead of determining that there are matters requiring the special competence of the administrative agency necessitating a stay of the judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court has
examined the conduct in the light of the regulatory statute and concluded either that the district court had jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, or that it did not. The primary jurisdiction doctrine has
been discussed, but has not been the basis for the Court's decision.
The doctrine has had more importance in the shipping cases, which
will be discussed separately, following an examination of the means
used to resolve conflicts between court and agency in antitrust
litigation in other regulated industries.
First, however, it should be emphasized that the regulated indus-
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tries are not per se exempt from the antitrust laws. 62 Moreover, pro
tanto repeals of the antitrust laws by regulatory statutes are not

favored, 63 and must be based upon a clear repugnancy between the
antitrust laws and the regulatory statute.6 4
The non-maritime cases have discussed both pro tanto repeal and
primary jurisdiction, although the result in each instance was that
the agency or the court had exclusive jurisdiction of the controversy

Thus, in United States v. Borden Co.,65 and Maryland & Va. Milk
ProducersAss'n v. United States,66 the Court found that the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,67 the Capper-Volstead Agricultural Producers' Associations Act,6 and Section 6 of the Clayton

Act,69 did not operate to repeal Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
as applied to the activities of agricultural cooperative associations.
The Court further found that the authority given to the Secretary of
Agriculture under Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act ° to issue
cease and desist orders upon finding that an agricultural association

had monopolized or restrained trade did not vest the Secretary with
primary jurisdiction to make such findings m Sherman Act prosecutions. The limited procedures of the Capper-Volstead Act were not
intended as substitutes for the Sherman Act, and were not intended

to postpone or prevent prosecution of the antitrust laws.
Pro tanto repeal and primary jurisdiction were blended m United
States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States." The defendants' activities
were admittedly outside the scope of the Sherman Act immunity
granted by Section 2 of the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act,72
relating to export associations, but the procedures outlined m Section
5 of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 7 which authorized the Federal Trade
62.Georgi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945).
63 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); California v. FTC, 369 U.S. 482,
485 (1962); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945); United States
Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 206 (1945); United States v, Borden
Co., 308
U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
64
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 63, at 350-51, Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 63, at 456-57; United States v. Borden Co., supra note 63,
at 198-99.
65308 U.S. 188 (1939).
66362 U.S. 458 (1960).
6750 Stat. 246 (1937), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-74 (1964).
6842 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1964).
6938 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
7042 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1964).
71325 U.S. 196 (1945).
7240 Stat. 517 (1918), 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1964).
7340 Stat. 517 (1918), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1964).
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Commission to investigate alleged violations of the Sherman Act by
export associations and, if necessary, to refer its findings and recommendations to the Attorney General for appropriate action, were
asserted by the defendants as prerequisites to any ]udicial proceedings under the Sherman Act. After observing that prior to the passage
of the Webb-Pomerene Act, the Department of Justice had plenary
authority to institute antitrust suits without prior recourse to other
agencies, the Court stated, "a pro tanto repeal of that authority, by
conferring upon the Commssion primary jurisdiction to determine
when, if at all, an antitrust suit may appropriately be brought, would
require a clear expression of that purpose by Congress. " 7 4 The pro
tanto repeal considered here was not a repeal of the antitrust laws by
the Webb-Pomerene Act, which would have been its conventional
use, but a "repeal," through the application of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine, of the immediate right to prosecute under the Sherman Act,
pending the agency's determination, which seems a curious use of the
doctrine of pro tanto repeal.
In United States v. Radio Corp. of America,5 the question was
whether approval by the Federal Communications Commission of an
exchange of television stations under Section 310(b) of the Comnmunications Act of 1934,7 barred suit by the Government in which the
transaction was challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
Court first reviewed the legislative history of the Communications
Act and found that it gave the FCC no power to decide antitrust issues
as such, and that FCC approval of the transaction did not prevent
enforcement of the antitrust laws in the courts. The effect of this holding was that the Communications Act did not constitute a pro tanto
repeal of the antitrust laws as to such approved exchanges. The
Court then stated "we now reach the question whether, despite the
legislative history, the over-all regulatory scheme of the Act requires
invocation of a primary jurisdiction doctrine. 71 The Court concluded
the doctrine was not applicable, and consequently the opimon does
not reveal what issues would have been referred to the Commission
had the decision been otherwise. Because the agency had already
approved the transaction and could not confer immunity thereby,
it is questionable whether the primary jurisdiction doctrine could
have served any purpose.7
74 325 U.S. at 206.
75358 U.S. 334 (1959).
7648 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1964).
77 358 U.S. at 346.
78 Cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353-54 (1963).
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California v. FPC,79 held that Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas
Act,80 which authorized the Federal Power Commission to approve
the acquisition of assets of natural gas companies, did not operate as
a repeal of the antitrust laws as to such transactions, and approval by
the agency did not bar a suit by the Government charging that the
acquisition of the assets violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act 8
A pro tanto repeal of the Sherman Act was, however, found in
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States.8 2 The Court
found that the broad powers granted to the Civil Aeronautics Board
by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,3 to grant or deny operating

certificates to air carriers, to investigate deceptive and unfair methods
of competition, and to approve purchases, mergers and arrangements
between common carners and air carriers with exemption from the
antitrust laws, gave to the Board exclusive jurisdiction of all questions

of injunctive relief against such activities."' The Court made it clear,
however, that the antitrust laws were not completely displaced, and
that questions of criminal law enforcement, and violations of antitrust laws other than those enumerated in the act, were left to the
courts.8 5
79369 U.S. 482 (1962).
80 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964).
8138 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). The situation was
held to be one in which the agency, rather than the court, should have stayed its hand.
The Court concluded that where a Clayton Act proceeding is pending before a district
court involving the stock acquisition of a pipeline company, the FFC should stay its
hand in a related proceeding in which, subsequent to the purchase of the stock, approval
of the FPC was sought to acquire the assets of the pipeline company. 369 U.S. at 490.
82 371 U.S. 296 (1963). The Government, at the request of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, brought a civil suit against Panagra and its equal shareholders, Pan American
and W R. Grace & Co., a common carrier, charging violations of §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the
Sherman Act. The complaint alleged that under the agreement forming Panagra, a
territorial division of air service was made, designed to avoid competition between
Panagra and Pan American. Also alleged was a conspiracy and monopoly by Pan Amencan and Grace of air service in certain areas of the U.S. and South America. Finally, Pan
American was charged with using its 50% control of Panagra to prevent it from obtaining
CAB approval of a competing air service. The transactions resulting in the territorial
divisions occurred before the passage of the first statute regulating the air industry.
8372 Stat. 737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§1301-542 (1964).
8
4 "Lunitation of routes and divisions of territories and the relation of common
carriers to air carriers are basic in this regulatory scheme. The acts charged in this civil
suit as antitrust violations are precise ingredients of the Board's authority in granting,
qualifying, or denying certificates to air carriers, in modifying, suspending, or revoking
them, and in allowing or disallowing affiliations between common carriers and air
carriers." 371 U.S. at 305. Although Board approval of the Panagra relationship was
not required because it pre-dated the regulatory statute, the Court declared that the
Board had ample authority to deal with all unfair methods of competition, including
those85which commenced before the statute. Id. at 303.
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Chief Justice Warren, dissenting, believed that by
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Both pro tanto repeal and primary jurisdiction were discussed by

the Court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank. 6 The Court
held that the Bank Merger Act of 1960,87 under which the Comptroller

of the Currency had authority to approve bank mergers, did not inmunize approved mergers from the antitrust laws, since no express
immunity was conferred by the act and no repugnancy was found
between the antitrust laws and the regulatory provisions. As to the
question of primary jurisdiction, the Court concluded that even if
the doctrine applied, it would not bar the suit because the proceedings
before the Comptroller were completed before the antitrust suit was
filed. "Furthermore, the considerations that militate against finding
a repeal of the antitrust laws by implication from the existence of a
regulatory scheme also argue persuasively against attenuating, by
postponing, the court's ]urisdiction to enforce the antitrust laws."88
A comparison of the antitrust cases involving the transportation
mdustries with those relating to other regulated industries shows that
the scope of the agency's powers is important m determining whether
there is any need for an accommodation between the regulatory and
antitrust laws. 9 The need for the doctrine to reconcile antitrust and
specifically exempting certain transactions, such as consolidations and mergers, from the
antitrust laws, Congress intended that the antitrust laws apply to all other activities,
including unfair practices and unfair methods of competition, and that a pro tanto repeal
of such activities where they resulted from route allocations, territorial divisions and
combinations between common earners and air earners, was contrary to the well-established rule that pro.tanto repeals by implication are to be found only where there is a
plain repugnancy between the regulatory and antitrust laws. Id. at 320-23.
The dissenting opinon believed that if any accommodation between regulatory and
antitrust laws were required, the primary jurisdiction doctrine rather than pro tanto
repeal should be used. Observing that the primary jurisdiction doctrine is more flexible
because it does not preclude a subsequent antitrust proceeding, the dissent continued,
"this mode of resolving conflicts between court and agency avoids the practical and
conceptual difficulties of pro tanto repeals by implication. Until today, the Court had
never failed to invoke primary jursdiction in preference to repeal by implication as a
means of accommodating the antitrust and regulatory laws; I see no basis for deviation
in the instant case from that salutary approach." Id. at 332. The dissenting opinion makes
no reference to the cases establishing this preference for the primary jurisdiction doctrine
in the antitrust cases. With the exception of the shipping cases, the preference seems
rather to be to discuss the issue in terms of pro tanto repeal, and to conclude that either
the court or the agency has exclusive jurisdiction of the activity.
86374 U.S. 321 (1963).
8774 Stat. 129 (1960), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964).
88 374 U.S. at 354.
89 Compare Keogh v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (railroad industry) and Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500 (1936) (railroad industry) and Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963)
(air transportation industry), with United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939)
(agricultural cooperative associations) and United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United
States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) (trade associations) and United States v. Radio Corp. of
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regulatory policy is much greater in the transportation industries
which are subject to close control, including rate regulation, than in
other industries in which there is no pervasive regulatory scheme. 9°
In the transportation industries the determination of whether the
regulatory statute is applicable depends upon whether it regulates
the specific activity in question and whether the agency is equipped
to provide adequate relief. Thus, where the alleged conspiracy manifests itself solely in discriminatory practices adequately redressed by the
Interstate Commerce Act, a private suitor's exclusive damage remedy
is that granted by the regulatory statute. 91 Because a shipper's exclusive damage remedy against unreasonable rates charged by rail
carriers was under the Interstate Commerce Act, his treble damage
action alleging that rates approved by the ICC were fixed by a
conspiracy at unreasonably high levels, was dismissed.92 And where
the acts charged as antitrust violations are "precise ingredients" of
the authority granted to the agency, the exclusive remedy lies under
the regulatory statute and not the antitrust laws.93
Where the activity transcends the scope of the regulatory statute
and involves new and independent wrongs for which the agency has
no remedy, it is open to the antitrust laws and may be the subject of
a criminal prosecution,94 or an injunction.95
America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (television industry) and Maryland & Va. Milk Producers
Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960) (agricultural cooperative associations) and
California v. FFC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) (natural gas industry) and United States v.
Philadelphia Nat1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (bankang industry).
9
o United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 89, at 352; California v.
FPC, supra note 89, at 485-86; United States v. Radio Corp. of America, supra note 89,
at 348-50.
91
Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500, 516 (1936). The
Court treated the matter in terms of the primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, relying upon Keogh v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); and
United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932). However, those cases
required some accommodation between the regulatory and antitrust laws because the
activity involved aspects of both regulatory schemes. By contrast, the plaintiff in
Terminal Warehouse failed to show anything more than a possible violation of the
Interstate Commerce Act, and no accommodation was necessary.
92Keogh v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 161-63 (1922). Referring to the
admonition of Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), for
uniformity between shippers, the Court stated that the recovery of treble damages for
the exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed would give
the plaintiff a preference over his competitors, and that even if his competitors filed
similar
actions the varying awards would make uniformity impossible. 260 U.S. at 163.
93
Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305-310 (1963).
94United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1913).
Although that part of the indictment charging discriminatory acts under the Interstate
Commerce Act was held to be within the primary jurisdiction of the ICC, see note 42
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Even where the regulatory statute exempts combinations of certain
persons from the operation of the antitrust laws, the association of
such persons with other groups to restrain trade, or the use of the
combined power as a leverage to suppress competition, may exceed
the antitrust privilege and be subject to the antitrust laws." And
although the regulatory scheme is pervasive, the antitrust laws are
not entirely superseded but are displaced only to the extent necessary
97
to carry out the regulatory purposes of the statute.
The antitrust cases in which jurisdiction of the agency was found:
the Keogh, Terminal Warehouse and Pan American cases, 98 did not
apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine. In each case the court concluded that the agency rather than the court had exclusive jurisdiction
of the conduct charged. Since only the agency had jurisdiction, there
was no reason to stay the judicial proceedings, and a dismissal was
appropriate. In the shnppmg cases, the primary jurisdiction doctrine
has played a more important part in resolving conflicts between court
and agency
Application of Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine
to Shipping Cases-The Supreme Court
Rate-fixing, pooling and other preferential or cooperative working
arrangements that have been approved under Section 15 of the Shipping Act are expressly immune from the antitrust laws. Violations of
section 15 are subject to a penalty of not more than $1,000 for each
supra, the counts alleging a conspiracy to restrain and destroy competition intransportation between the U.S., the Territory of Alaska and British Columbia, were subject to
the antitrust laws without prior reference to the agency.
95 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 455-56 (1945). The Court held that
rate-fixing combinations between rail earners can be enjoined. It conceded that because
of the decision in the Keogh case, the plaintiff could not recover damages resulting
from the conspiracy, but ruled that since the ICC had no power to enjoin conspiracies,
that remedy was available to the courts. Today railroad combinations approved by the
ICC are immune from the antitrust laws under the Reed-Bulwmkle Act, 62 Stat. 472
(1948), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1964). In the Pan American case, Mr. Justice
Douglas, who delivered the opinion in the Georgia case, suggested that the Georgia
result might be different today. Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S.
296, 306 n.11 (1963).
9
0 Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 472 (1960);
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 808 (1945); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1939). See Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 371 n.5 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
97 Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305 (1963).
98Keogh v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Terminal Warehouse Co.
v. Pennsylvama R.R., 297 U.S. 500 (1936); Pan American World Airways v. United
States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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day such violation continues. Furthermore, a person injured by a
violation of any section of the Shipping Act, including section 15, may
recover reparations for such injury under section 22. The fundamental question in the shipping antitrust cases has been what effect
the failure to obtain approval of section 15--type agreements, has on
the operatiaon of the antitrust 'laws. While the implementation of
unapproved agreements is clearly a violation of section 15, litigation
has centered on the issue of whether the exclusive remedy against
such activity is an administrative proceeding under section 22, or
whether the failure to obtain section 15 approval subjects the parties
to the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court first considered the application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine to the shippmg industry in United States Nay.
Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.9 The plaintiff, a common carrier m foreign
commerce, charged that the defendant steamship compames had
conspired to restrain and monopolize commerce in the trans-Atlantic
trade, and sought to enjoin the defendants from continuing their
anti-competitive practices. The primary complaint was the inplementation of a dual-rate contract system under which a lower, contract
rate was available only to suppers who patronized defendants exclusively, all other shippers paying a higher, non-contract rate. Other
practices, such as coercion of shippers, rebates and trade disparagement of the plaintiff were also alleged. The district court granted a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the controversy was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Shipping Board. Judgment for the defendants was affirmed by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
Because the Shipping Act closely paralleled the Interstate Commerce
Act, the Court held that the settled construction of the Interstate
Commerce Act must be applied to the Shipping Act in analogous circumstances. The Court then reviewed Abilene °" and subsequent
primary jurisdiction cases decided under the Interstate Commerce
Act, and found that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was equally
applicable to cases decided under the Shipping Act:
The act is restrictive in its operation upon some of the activities of
common carriers by water, and permissive in respect of others. Their
business involves questions of an exceptional character, the solution
of which may call for the exercise of a high degree of expert and
technical knowledge. Whether a given agreement among such carriers should be held to contravene the act may depend upon a consideration of economic relations, of facts peculiar to the business or
99 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
100 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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its history, of competitive conditions in respect of the shipping of
foreign countries, and of other relevant circumstances, generally unfamiliar to a judicial tribunal, but well understood by an adminstralive body especially trained and expenenced in the intricate and
technical facts and usages of the shippmg trade; and with which that
body, consequently, is better able to deal.101
This is the Court's most expressive pronouncement of the reasons
underlying the importance of the primary ]urisdiction doctrine in the
regulation of the shipping industry The Court then concluded:
A comparison of the enumeration of wrongs charged in the bill
with the provisions of the sections of the Shipping Act above outlined
conclusively shows, without going into detail, that the allegations
either constitute direct and basic charges of violations of these provisions or are so interrelated with such charges as to be in effect a
component part of them; and the remedy is that afforded by the
Shipping Act, which to that extent supersedes the anti-trust laws.
Compare Keogh v. Chicago & N. W R.Co. supra (260 U.S. 162, 67
L.ed. 187, 43 S.Ct. 47). The matter, therefore, is within the exclusive
preliminary jurisdiction of the Shipping Board.10 2
The fact that the agreement entered into by the defendants was not
filed with the Board did not give private parties the right to injunctive
relief under the Clayton Act, the Court held, whatever the rights of
the Government may be in such instances.
If -there be a failure to fie an agreement as required by § 15, the
board, as in the case of other violations of the act, is fully authorized
by § 22, supra, to afford relief upon complaint or upon its own motion. Its orders, in that respect, as in other respects, are then, under
§ 31, for the first time, open to a judicial proceeding to enforce, suspend or set them aside in accordance, generally, with the rules and
limitations announced by this court in respect of like orders made by
the Interstate Commerce Commission.10 3
The Court dismissed the argument that the agreement was one
which the Board could not lawfully approve. Approval or disapproval
of a section 15 agreement was within the Board's primary jurisdiction.
"Moreover, having regard to the peculiar nature of ocean traffic, it is
not impossible that, although an agreement be apparently bad on
its face, it properly might, upon a full consideration of all the attending circumstances, be approved or allowed to stand with modifications. 1 0 4
101284 U.S. at 485.
102 lbd.
103 Id. at 486-87.
104 Id. at

487.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

The result of the application of the primary ]urisdiction doctrine

Cunard was a dismissal of the action for injunctive relief. There
was no referral of any issue to the agency, and court Jurisdiction
instead of being stayed was ousted. Although the Court discussed the
controversy in terms of the exclusive preliminary jurisdiction of the
agency, its dismissal operated as a holding that the exclusive remedy
where injunctive relief against alleged unified agreements is sought is
that afforded by the Shipping Act, which to that extent supersedes, or
repeals pro tanto, the antitrust laws.
Fourteen years after Cunard, the section 15 exemption was again
discussed, in United States v. American Union Transp., Inc. ° 5 That
litigation did not involve questions of primary jurisdiction. The issue
was whether ocean freight forwarders were subject to the Shipping
Act and thus required to comply with orders of the Commission requesting certain information pertaining to their activities. The Court
reviewed the provisions of the Shipping Act in detail to show that the
intimate relationship of an ocean freight forwarder to shippers and
carriers gave him a unique opportunity to engage in practices declared to be unlawful by various provisions of the act, and that jurisdiction of the Commission over forwarders was essential to effectuate
the policies of the act. In discussing section 15, the Court observed
that the antitrust exemption applies to agreements which have been.
filed with and approved by the Commission, and that "it should not
be necessary to emphasize, in view of the statute's plain language,
that, as is indicated, the exemption arises not upon the mere filing of
the agreement, but only after approval by the Commission."1 "
This dictum should be considered in the light of the Cunard
ruling that where there is a failure to file an agreement as required
in

105 327 U.S. 437 (1946). In the interim, Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 297 U.S. 500 (1936), was decided. See note 91 supra. In that treble damage
action against a rail carrier and a warehouse, the Court described the Cunard case
as having held that the right to sue under the antitrust laws was partially superseded
with respect to private parties, by the adoption of the Shipping Act, which provided the
exclusive remedy. Id. at 512-13. The same considerations which dictated the result in
the Keogh and Cunardcases as to the need for a uniform system of regulation were said
to apply with undiminished force to suits for damages. The Interstate Commerce Act, like
the Shipping Act, said the Court, provides the means for determining whether preferences exist, and also gives a cause of action for damages for violations of its provisions.
"For the wrongs that it denounces it prescribes a fitting remedy which, we think, was
meant to be exclusive." Id. at 514. The Court m Terminal Warehouse believed the same
principle applied to treble damage actions for past wrongs and suits for injunctive relief.
There are, however, important distinctions between the two types of remedies, and
these distinctions governed the result in subsequent cases.
106 327 U.S. at 447 n.8. (Italics in original.)
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by section 15, the agency is authorized to grant relief under section
22 upon complaint or upon its own motion, and that a private suitor
may not obtain injunctive relief. The A.U.T dictum would indicate
that unapproved agreements are subject to the antitrust laws, although Cunard held to the contrary where the antitrust suit was
brought by a private litigant for injunctive relief. The dictum is not
necessarily inconsistent with the Cunard holding if one realizes that
antitrust immunity may not extend to unapproved agreements, but that
antitrust injunctive remedy against such agreements may be superseded by the Shipping Act. This question will be considered later.
The Supreme Court next discussed the primary jurisdiction of the
agency in Far East Conference v. United States.oT The Government
brought an action to enjoin alleged violations of the Sherman Act by
the Far East Conference and its member lines, who were engaged
in the Far East trade under an agreement approved by the Shipping
Board. The conference established a dual rate contract system which
went beyond the scope of the approved conference agreement and
failed to obtain approval of the arrangement. The district court demed
defendants' motion to dismiss on the prinary jurisdiction ground,
holding that the immunity of section 15 does not extend to agreements beyond its scope which may violate Section 1 of the Sherman
Act and that since the Shipping Act was not a repeal pro tanto of the
antitrust laws, the exemption, while arguably a substantive defense,
may not be raised as a procedural bar to the right of the Government
to prosecute the action.10 8 The district court believed the Cunard case
was distinguishable because the private litigant there had an enforceable right as well as an adequate remedy under the Sippmg
Act, but, the court concluded, the United States had no similar right
or remedy under the act.
The Supreme Court saw no reason to depart from the Cunard
decision, which it held to be controlling. Cunard, said the Court,
"applied a principle, now firmly established, that in cases raising issues
of fact not within the conventional experience of Judges or cases requirmg the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created
by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed
over." 19 The only real distinction between the Cunard and Far East
cases was that the plaintiff in Cunard was a private individual rather
than the Government. That difference was immaterial to the Court,
107 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
108 United States v. Far East Conference, 94 F Supp. 900, 903 (D.N.J. 1951).
109 342 U.S. at 574.
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since the same need for administrative expertise applied regardless
of the plaintiffs identity The Court rejected any notion that the
Government was without a remedy under the Slipping Act, stating,
"it is almost frivolous to suggest that the Maritime Board would deny
standing to the United States as a complainant." n"
The Court considered whether to stay the case pending the Board's
action on the dual rate contract, or to dismiss. It distingtushed the
conclusion in El Dorado Terminal,"' where the Court ordered a stay
pending the ICC's determination of the legality of a tank car leasing
agreement, on the ground that El Dorado Terminal raised only incidentally a question for the agency's decision, whereas the controversy
before it involved questions within the general scope of the Board's
jurisdiction. Since an order of the Board would be subject to judicial
review, and, if favorable to the Government, could be enforced by a
district court under Section 29 of the Shipping Act, the Court concluded that no purpose would be served by staying the action, noting
that a similar action could be instituted later if appropriate.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Mr.
Justice Black, stated that if the dual rate contract system had been
approved under section 15, the Sherman Act exemption would apply,
"but that exemption from the Sherman Act can be acquired only in
the manner prescribed by § 15. Here no effort was made to obtain it.
Hence the petitioners are at large, subject to all of the restraints of the
Sherman Act."" 2
While Cunard left unanswered the question of the Government's
right to injunctive relief against the implementation of unapproved
agreements, the Far East Conference case made it clear that, prior to
an administrative determination of the approvability of such agreement, all suitors, public or private, are foreclosed from injunctive
relief.
The way in which the Court disposed of the litigation in the Far
East Conference case presents some procedural uncertainties. The
reason it ordered a dismissal rather than a stay was as follows: the
question for initial administrative decision, the approvability of the
agreement, involved questions within the general scope of the Board's
jurisdiction, rather than an "incidental" administrative question as in
the El Dorado Terminal case where a stay was ordered. Since an order
of the Board disapproving the agreement and ordering its implemen110 Id.at 576.

i11 General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940).

112 342 U.S. at 578.
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tation discontinued could be enforced, if necessary, under section 29
by a district court on the application of the Attorney General, there
was no need to stay the action. If the Board approved the prospective
implementation of the agreement, the Government would of course
have the right to seek judicial review Tins would indicate that the
exclusive injunctive remedy against the implementation of an unapproved agreement is a section 22 complaint, and upon a determination
by the agency that the agreement is unapprovable, a section 29 enforcement proceeding in the district court, if necessary However, the
Court also stated that a similar suit could be filed later, if appropriate.
The purpose of such a subsequent suit was not disclosed, and, in view
of the administrative complaint and judicial enforcement procedure
authorized by sections 22 and 29, or in the alternative judicial review,
there seems to be none, unless it is to provide an alternative to a section 29 enforcement proceeding.
Next came Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co.," 3 winch was
a judicial proceeding to review the lawfulness of an order of the
Board, rather than a suit alleging violations of the antitrust laws. The
primary jurisdiction doctrine was not directly involved because the
agency had made its determination, and the issue was whether the
determination was correct. However, the Court was faced with the
argument that the Cunard and FarEast Conference decisions dictated
the result, and its discussion of those cases amplifies their meaning
and illustrates the Court's conception of the proper functions of court
and Comnission.
Isbrandtsen,like the Cunard and Far East Conference cases, involved the legality of a dual rate contract system. As a result of prior
litigation,1 4 the Board's approval of the dual rate contract system
of the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, without a hearing,
was set aside, and the Board was ordered to consider the approvability
of the conference's dual rate contract under the standards of section
15. Subsequently the Board conducted hearings and approved the
agreement. The record before the Board showed that the dual rate
system was proposed by the conference for use in a rate war being
waged between the conference lines and Isbrandtsen, a non-conference carrier.
On Isbrandtsen's petition to review the approval of the dual rate
agreement, the court of appeals set aside the Board's order, holding
113 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
114Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denzed, 347
U.S. 990 (1954).
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that the dual rate agreement violated section 14 Third of the Slhpping
Act, which prohibits common carriers from retaliating against shippers by resorting to any discrimmatmg or unfair methods." 5 The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that dual rate contracts of the type
under consideration were not similar to the "requirements contracts"
that were discussed by the Alexander Committee and not specifically
outlawed by the Shipping Act. Unlike ordinary requirements contracts, dual rate agreements existing in the shipping industry gave
no guarantee of services and rates for any substantial period, and
contained substantial liquidated damage provisions which resembled
the objectionable features of the deferred rebate system prohibited
by section 14 First of the act. The Court concluded that the general
provisions of section 14 Third were intended by Congress to outlaw
practices in addition to those specifically prohibited elsewhere in section 14, when such practices are used to stifle the competitaon of independent camers." 6 Making use of the Board's finding that the conference's dual rate contract was instituted to suppress competition from
Isbrandtsen, the Court concluded that the agreement was a device
made unlawful by section 14 Third,1 1 7 and affirmed the decision of
the court of appeals which set aside the Board's approval of the
agreement.
The failure of the Court in the Cunard and Far East Conference

cases to find the dual jate contracts in those cases to be unlawful
under section 14 Third foreclosed, according to the argument of the
conference and the Board, which had intervened, any determination
that the disputed contract was illegal under that section. The Court
disagreed, stating that the Cunard and Far East Conference cases,

"while holding that the Board had primary jurisdiction to hear the
case in the first instance, did not signify that the statute left the Board
free to approve or disapprove the agreements under attack."1 8 The
referral to the Board in those cases was a recognition that the agency's
specialized knowledge and its informed findings would be of valuable
assistance to the court as a preliminary to the court's ultimate task
of assessing the legality of the practices:
Thus the Court's action in Cunard and Far East Conference is to
be taken as a deferral of what might come to be the ultimate question
-the construction of § 14 Third-rather than an implicit holding that
the Board could properly approve the practices there involved. The
holding that the Board had primary junsdiction, m short, was a de" 5 1sbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 239 F.2d 933, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
116 356 U.S. at 495.
117Id. at 500.

11sd. at 498.
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vice to prepare the way, if the litigation should take its ultimate
course, for a more informed and precise determination by the Court

of the scope and meaning of the statute as applied to those particular
circumstances." 9
The Court stated that since section 14 Third invalidated dual rate
contracts only when they are employed as predatory devices, the
Court m the Cunard and Far East Conference cases could not, without such a finding, make a determination under section 14 Third.
Those decisions did not, therefore, foreclose a ruling that section 14
Third prohibited the contract in a case m which the Board had made
the necessary preliminary findings.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who delivered the opinion of the Court
in the Far East Conference case, dissented in an opinion concurred
in by Mr. Justice Burton. The dissent believed the Alexander Committee was aware of the existence and purpose of dual rate contract
systems. The failure to prohibit such practices specifically, while
outlawing deferred rebates, fighting ships and retaliatory actions,
proved, according to the dissent, that Congress did not wish to prohibit the dual rate contract system.
The dissenting opinion believed that the conclusion of the majority
was contrary to the decisions m Cunard and Far East Conference.
In both cases, Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted, the plaintiffs alleged that
the dual rate contract system was illegal per se under section 14 and
that the Board was without power to approve it, and in both cases
it was alleged that the purpose of dual rate contracts was to eliminate
competition. While the immediate issue in those cases was the applicability of the primary jurisdiction principle to a proceedng involving
the legality of the dual rate contract system, the conclusion that the
Board, rather than the courts, must adjudicate the complaints against
the contracts constituted, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view, "the
plainest possible recognition that it was for the Board to approve or
disapprove the dual-rate contract system complained of, and, therefore, that the practice was not illegal as a matter of law-that is, by
virtue of a statutory condemnation." 120 To refer the approvability of
dual rate contracts to the Board and then to overturn the Board's
approval of such agreements, transformed the doctrine of primary jursdiction, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, into an empty ritual.
Surely it is a form of playfulness to make resort to -the Board a prerequisite when the judicial determination of law could have been
made precisely as though there had been no proceeding before the
"D id. at 498-99.
120 Id. at 522.
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Board. Tins is to make a mockery of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and to interpret the decisions in the 1Cunard
and Far East
21
Conference cases as utterly wasteful futilities.
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a separate dissenting opinion, in which
he agreed with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the subject dual rate
contract did not violate section 14 Third, but did not subscribe to
the view that the Cunard and Far East Conference cases decided, sub
silentio, the question of the legality of such agreements under section
122
14 Third.
Where an administrative determination is necessary to gather and
appraise the facts for a better-informed judicial definition, the pnmary jurisdiction doctrine provides a means for obtaining such an
appraisal. However, the agency's definition of the legal consequences
of the facts in controversy is a judicial rather than an administrative
function. The ultimate result may be, as in the Isbrandtsen case, that
the facts marshaled by the agency show that the agency's analysis of
their legal consequences was incorrect. The utility of the prinary
jurisdiction doctrine is not restricted thereby, because the referral of
issues involving complex and intricate technical facts to the administrative agency does not constitute pre-approval of the agency's conclusions based upon such facts, as long as in the review process due
regard is given to the agency's specialized competence.
The Cunard and Far East Conference cases foreclosed both private litigants and the Government from obtaining injunctive relief
under the antitrust laws without preliminary resort to the agency
for a determination of the legality of the conduct under section 15.
Those decisions did not, however, define the extent to which the antitrust laws were displaced by the Shipping Act. Whether suits based
upon past conduct, such as treble damage actions, were barred was
also left unanswered. Decisions of the lower courts were conflicting. 2 3
The agency entrusted with the duty of approving or disapproving
section 15 agreements was of the opinion that such anticompetitive
agreements were intended by Congress, and by the Cunard and Far
East Conference decisions, to be mimune from the antitrust laws even
121 Id.

at 519.

Id. at 524. The Isbrandtsen decision was followed by legislation to perpetuate
existing dual rate contract systems until Congress had an opportunity to investigate
such arrangements. The investigation resulted in the passage of Pub. L. No. 87-346
(approved October 3, 1961), 75 Stat. 762 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1964), which
added § 14b to the Shipping Act, authorizing the Comission to approve dual rate
contracts pursuant to the standards of that section. See note 14 supra.
123 See note 157 znfra and accompanying text.
122
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though unapproved because, the Board believed, section 15 superseded the antitrust laws, and the sole consequences of a failure to
obtain approval of a section 15-type agreement were penalty actions
as provided in section 15 and reparations proceedings under section 22.12

The answers came with CarnationCo. v. Pacific Westbound Conference,12 a treble damage action under the Clayton Act against the

Pacific Westbound Conference, the Far East Conference, and their
respective member lines, charging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. Each of the two conferences operated under an
agreement approved by the agency, and, in addition, an mter-conference agreement, providing for the joint fixmg of rates by both conferences, had also been approved. The complaint alleged that the
defendants had entered into a secret rate-flxmg agreement which went
beyond the scope of the approved agreements and that the activities
under the secret agreement were not exempt from the antitrust laws.
Prior to the filing of the treble damage action, the Board instituted
an investigation of the approved ]omt agreement between the two
conferences to determine whether it was a true and complete agreement of the parties, and whether it was being carried out in a lawful
manner under the Shippmg Act. Carnation intervened in the agency
proceeding. The complaint alleged that at the hearing in the administrative proceeding, plaintiff learned of the existence of the unapproved agreement, and thereupon filed the treble damage action. The
motion of the defendants to dismiss, on the ground that the Shipping
Act provided plaintiff's exclusive remedy, was granted and the court
12 4 A witness for the Board testified in Hearings Before Antitrust Subcommittee of

the House Committee on the judiciary on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries:
Ocean Freight Industry, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 1, vol. 1, at 30 (1959) [heremafter cited as C-.Txn Hn.mNcs], that an agreement, whether or not approved, is not
amenable to prosecution under the antitrust laws if it is of the type contemplated by §
15. According to the witness, the Board, when it approves an agreement, does not thereby
confer exemption. The exemption is there by operation of law, because of the subject
matter of the agreement. The passage from the Cunard opinion, quoted in the text accompanying note 103 supra, was cited as support for this theory. Legal opinions were
furnished the Celler Committee by the Federal Maritime Board, concluding that unapproved agreements were exempt from the antitrust laws, and by the Justice Department
arrvmg at a contrary conclusion. CELLm HEAUNGs, pt. 1, vol. 1, at 923-38. The Celler
Committee disagreed with the Board's conclusion, and added that if the Board's position
were in fact correct, the law should be changed. CR.=E REPOnT at 332-33.
125 383 U.S. 213 (1966) (amended opinion). The Court's opinion was delivered
on February 28, 1966, 34 U.S.L. WEET 4181, but was amended on March 7, 1966. The
official report contains the amended opinion. For discussion of the reason for the amendments, see text accompanying notes 138-40 nfra.
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of appeals affirmed.'26 The court of appeals held that the Cunard and
Far East Conference cases were controlling, and the fact the action
was for treble damages rather than injunctive relief did not change
the result. The rationale of the Cunard and FarEast Conference cases,
said the court of appeals, was as applicable to a treble damage suit as
an injunction action because in both cases preliminary resort to the
Commission is necessary "to secure the uniformity of application of
the Congressional scheme, and in order to procure resolution of the
facts by a body having an adequate appreciation of the intricate business
of transportation by sea."12 7 The court found authority for its conclusion in American Union Transp. v. River Plate & Brazil Conferences,28
which held that the Cunard and Far East Conference cases required
a dismissal of an action for treble damages based upon the implementation of an unapproved agreement.
The court of appeals considered whether a stay or a dismissal was
appropriate. It concluded that "the only possible reason for allowing
the action to be retained on the district court docket would be to
avoid a claim that antitrust action was barred by the statute of limitations. Since we hold that such an action cannot at this date be maintamed, this reason is not applicable here." 2 9
The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion delivered by
the Chief Justice. The Court concluded first that the express exemption of section 15 covers approved agreements which are lawful under
that section, but not the implementation of unapproved agreements
which is specifically prohibited by section 15. Drawing an analogy
from the BordeneO interpretation of a sinilar immunity provision of
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, the Court declared that
"the creation of an antitrust exemption for rate-making activities
which are lawful under the Shipping Act implies that unlawful ratemaking activities are not exempt."13 ' Having found that the specific
exemption of section 15 did not apply, the Court considered the defendants' contention that the terms and legislative history of the
126

Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 336 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1964).

12ld. at 655.
128 126 F Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), affirmed per curiam on opinion below, 222
F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1955). See note 157 mfra.
129 336 F.2d at 667 n.32. At the time the court of appeals rendered its decision the
Commission's investigation had not concluded, and there was no administrative determination that the conferences were acting beyond the scope of their approved agreement.
By the time the case was before the Supreme Court, the agency had determined that
the approved agreement did not cover the activities of the conferences.
ISO United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 201 (1939).
131383 U.S. at 216-17.
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Shipping Act demonstrate a legislative purpose to repeal the antitrust laws in their application to the shipping industry The Court
rejected this argument, relying on its statement in the Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank case that "repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from
a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found
m cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory
provisions." 32 The Court found nothing in the legislative history of
the Shipping Act to show a congressional desire that the antitrust
exemption be broader than that specifically provided in section 15.
The defendants also argued that treble damage awards to shippers
are rebates and that unequal rebates would result from the varying
awards which would inevitably be granted by different courts and
juries, thus making it inpossible to maintain equality between shippers. This theory, while persuasive in the Keogh case 33 which involved
rate-fixing under the Interstate Commerce Act, was rejected.
We believe that Congress was concerned with assuring equality of
treatment by the conferences, not with equality of treatment by
junes in collateral proceedings. There is no reason to believe that
Congress would want to deprive all shippers of their right to treble
damages merely to assure that
some shippers do not obtain more
34
generous awards than others.'
The Court then discussed the Cunard and Far East Conference
cases, and held those decisions were not controlling. "Those cases
merely hold that courts must refrain from imposing antitrust sanctions
for activities of debatable legality under the Shipping Act in order
to avoid the possibility of conflict between the courts and the Commission." 35 The Court explained that the Cunard and Far East Conference situations involved two sources of possible conflict between
the courts and the agency First, the plaintiffs in Cunard and Far East
Conference sought to enjoin the alleged implementation of unapproved agreements. Since the agency had not passed on the conduct,
it was possible that the district court might conclude that the activities were in furtherance of an unapproved agreement and thus subject to the antitrust laws, while the agency might in a later proceeding
determine that the same conduct came within the scope of an approved agreement and was thus exempt from the antitrust laws.
Second, if the district court in the Cunard and Far East Conference
132 United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963), quoted
in 383 U.S. at 217-18.
'33 Keogh v. Chicago & N.W Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922).
134383 U.S. at 219 n.3.
135 Id. at 220.
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cases enjoined the activities, the Commission, even if it agreed that
the conduct was not within the scope of an approved agreement,
might be hampered if it decided to approve the prospective implementation of the agreement. These considerations did not, however,
require that the shipping industry be totally immune from the antitrust laws. Instead, said the Court: "The Far East and Cunard prmciples permit courts to subject activities which are clearly unlawful
under the Shipping Act to antitrust sanctions so long as the courts
refrain from taking action which might interfere with the Commission's exercise of its lawful powers."" 6 The award of treble damages
for past conduct would not interfere with any future action of the
Commission. Since the Commission has no power to approve agreements retroactively, "the Far East and Cunard principles only preclude courts from awarding treble damages when the7 defendants'
conduct is arguably lawful under the Shipping Act."3
In Carnation,an action for treble damages rather than injunctive
relief, the risk of conflict between court and agency jurisdiction lay
in the danger that the court might find the defendants' activities constituted the implementation of an unapproved agreement, while the
agency night later conclude the conduct was within the scope of an
approved agreement. The Supreme Court's decision, as originally
written, found that no such risk existed because the Commission had
finished its investigation of the joint agreement between the two defendant conferences, and had concluded that the conduct complained
of was not within the scope of the agreement, and furthermore that
the time for judicial review had expired. The Court in its original
opimon concluded "thus, there can no longer be any doubt that respondents' activities violated the Shipping Act and are not arguably
exempt from antitrust regulation." S3 However, it was subsequently
called to the Court's attention that the Commission had amended its
decision, thereby reopening the time for judicial review, and that the
conferences had filed an appeal from the decision. Because of the
pending appeal, defendants' conduct was still "arguably"' exempt from
antitrust regulation. The pending appeal from the Commission's determination did not alter the substance of the Court's decision. The
opinion was amended to reflect the pending appeal, and, as in the
original decision, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the
district court, but instead of instructing the district court to proceed
136 Id. at 221.
187 Id. at 222.

13834 U.S.L. Wxx 4181, 4183 (U.S. February 28, 1966).
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with a determination of the antitrust issues as in the original opinion,
the Court remanded "with instructions to stay the action pending
the final outcome of the Shipping Act proceedings and then to proceed m a manner consistent with this opnmon."139
The lack of finality of the Commission proceedings thus required
a stay of the judicial proceeding. This result was foreshadowed in the
court's original opinion in which it observed, at that time by way
of dictum, that even if the activities complained of were arguably
exempt, it was not appropriate for the court of appeals to dismass the
action, because "a treble damage action for past conduct cannot be
easily reinstituted at a later time. Such clais are subject to the
Statute of Limitations and are likely to be barred by the time the
Commission acts. Therefore, we believe that the Court of Appeals
should have stayed the action instead of dismissing it."i40
By staying the antitrust proceedings until the final outcome of the
agency proceeding, the Court applied the prinary jurisdiction doctrine to prevent any conflict which might have resulted had the Commission's determination been set aside on review and a final decision
rendered by the agency that the conduct was within the scope of the
approved agreement. Pro tanto repeal of the antitrust laws was inappropriate. The specific exemption of section 15 indicated a legislative intent not to provide broader immunity, and, unlike the situation m the Pan American case, a treble damage action for past and
completed conduct implementing an unapproved section 15-type
agreement does not involve "precise ingredients" of the agency's authority in approving or disapproving agreements under section 15. 4
However, an action for injunctive relief stands on different ground.
It is clear from the Cunard and Far East Conference opinions that
the power to approve or disapprove rate-fixing agreements is ex42
clusively that of the Commission, subject to judicial review'
The Carnation decision did not change that conclusion. Interim
injunctive relief restraining activity not arguably lawful until the
plaintiff has had an opportunity to obtain relief from the Commission
would not infringe upon the Commission's freedom to pass on such
139 383 U.S. at 224 (amended opimon). The appeal filed by the conferences has not
yet been decided. Pacific Westbound Conference v. United States, appeal docketed, No.
23506, 5th Cir., March 17, 1966. The appeal was transferred from the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit where it had commenced on December 30, 1965.
140 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4181, 4183 (U.S. February 28, 1966).
141 Cf. Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305 (1963).
142 United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932); accord,
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573-74 (1952).
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conduct.1 43 A permanent injunction would have that result because,
assuming the conduct is not even arguably lawful, a permanent
injunction would interfere with an agency determination that the
activity should be approved prospectively The Shipping Act thus
appears to repeal pro tanto the right, otherwise available under the
antitrust laws, to enjoin permanently rate-fixng and other anticompetitive agreements. An action for such relief involves "precise
ingredients" of the Commission's authority to approve, disapprove or
modify agreements contemplated by section 15. In place of a judicial
proceeding to permanently enjoin the activity, the Shipping Act offers
the right of a section 22 complaint proceeding followed by judicial
review if the conduct is approved, or a section 29 enforcement action
in a district court if the Commission disapproves the conduct and
its order to discontinue the activity is ignored. This adminstrative
procedure would leave intact an injured party's right under the Carnation decision to recover damages for any injury resulting from the
implementation of an agreement without prior Commission approval.
Carnationmakes it clear that despite the jurisdiction of the Commission to award reparations for any violation of the act, including
violations of section 15, rate-fixing activities pursuant to unapproved
agreements are not exempt from the antitrust laws. One injured by
such activities may seek reparations from the Commission or may
institute an antitrust action for treble damages, because "the rights
which petitioner claims under the antitrust laws are entirely collateral
to those which petitioner nght have sought under the Shipping Act.
This does not suggest that petitioner might have sought recovery
under both, but petitioner did have its choice." 44
In treble damage actions for conduct allegedly constituting un14 3 See text accompanying notes 211-215 znfra, for discussion of judicial aid to

maintain the status quo pending an administrative determination. In Pennsylvania
Motor Truck Ass'n v. Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal Ass'n, 183 F Supp. 910
(E.D. Pa. 1960), where the court enjoined the enforcement of a tariff provision pending
the agency's determination of its lawfulness, the Cunard and Far East Conference cases
were distinguished on the ground that they held district courts have no jurisdiction in
antitrust cases to determine the legality of agreements. "Such issues are within the
exclusive competence and primary jurisdiction of the expert administrative agency-the
Federal Maritime Board. But, in those cases there was no question raised as to the
propriety of the court in issuing an munction to hold the matter in status quo." Id. at
915-16, If, however, the conduct is debatably lawful under § 15 even interim injunctive
relief may interfere with a determination that the conduct was within the scope of an
approved agreement. Intern injunctive relief would involve no risk of conflict with the
agency's jurisdiction only if limited to activity not arguably lawful, and in such instances
may offer an appropriate solution until the agency has made its determination. Approval
by the agency of such activity prospectively will not be affected by such interim relief.
144 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 224 (1966).
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plementation of unapproved agreements, the primary jurisdiction
doctrine applies when the conduct is arguably lawful under the
Slhpping Act. If the defendants' activity is arguably within the scope
of an approved agreement, the district court should stay the action
until the Commission exercises its exclusive right to make the initial
factual determination. If the ultimate determination of the admmistrative proceeding is that the conduct is within the scope of an approved agreement, the activity is exempt from the antitrust laws, and
the treble damage action should be dismissed. If the Commission
concludes that the activity is outside the scope of filed agreements,
the court may proceed with the antitrust action free of any risk of
possible conflict with the Commission's jurisdiction.
The lower court cases have discussed the primary jurisdiction
doctrine in contexts not yet considered by the Supreme Court. A
review of those decisions provides a more comprehensive understanding of the doctrine's place in shipping regulation.
Application of the Doctrine to Shipping CasesThe Lower Courts
General Principles
Before considering how the lower courts have applied the primary
jurisdiction doctrine in the antitrust and other areas, there are some
general standards announced by the courts which should be discussed at this point.
The primary jurisdiction doctrine has been applied to threatened
as well as actual violations of the Shipping Act. 4 The doctrine may
be invoked against a plaintiff who is not subject to the Shipping Act.146
Since "any person" may file a complaint with the Commission under
section 22, it is difficult to conceive of a class of persons who could
avoid the application of the doctrine on the ground that they are
disqualified from section 22 proceedings. 47
The fact that the Commission has rendered a decision in a similar
45
1
Wisconsin & Mich. Transp. Co. v. Pere Marquette Line Steamers, 210 Wis. 391,
396, 245 N.W 671, 673 (1932).
146 Rivoli Trucking Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 167 F Supp. 940, 942
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), motion for leave to file amended and supplemental complaint denied,
167 F Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). A trucker, although not subject to the Shipping
Act, may bring a complaint proceeding under § 22, and his claim was therefore
referable to the agency.
'47 Cf. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 576 (1952), where
the Government's defense against the application of the doctrine on the ground it was
not a "person" eligible to file a complaint with the agency was met by the response
that it was "almost frivolous" to suggest that the agency would deny standing to the
Government as a complainant.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. is

case does not abrogate the need for prior resort to the agency, since
what the Commission may have done under similar circumstances
14 8
might not control the disposition of the case under consideration.
The failure of a party to seek an administrative determination of
a question prior to the filing of suit against him does not preclude hun
from asserting the doctrine to refer the question to the agency 3.9
The Antitrust Cases
In some instances the courts have held that where the acts complamed of in an antitrust case fall within the scope of the Shipping
Act, that showing alone is sufficient to invoke the primary jurisdiction
doctrine. This was the approach taken in Rivoli Trucking Corp. v.
New York Shipping Ass'n,1 0° Maldonado v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,' and
CarlosCrespo Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.15
148 Wisconsin & Mich. Transp. Co. v. Pere Marquette Line Steamers, 67 F.2d
937 (7th Cir. 1933). The court relied on the holding in the Cunard case that what the
agency may have done in another case under different circumstances should not govern
the resolution of the controversy in issue. Id. at 938
149 See Port of Bandon v. Oliver J. Olson & Co., 175 F Supp. 736, 742 (D. Ore.
1959). The fact that the respondent failed to file a complaint with the agency attacking
the lawfulness of a tariff charge did not prevent him from obtaining a stay of a suit to
collect unpaid charges under the tariff. The reason given for the court's conclusion was
that it is not the filing of an unlawful tariff that gives grounds for affirmnative relief, but
its attempted enforcement. The court appears to say that any administrative proceeding
by respondent prior to the attempted enforcement of the tariff would have been premature. However, even where the party seeking to invoke the doctrine could have instituted an administrative proceeding, his failure to do so should not foreclose him from
obtaining a referral of appropriate questions raised by way of defense. See United
States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 73-74 (1956). In Bird v. S.S. Fortuna, 262
F Supp. 24 (D. Mass. 1966), the court said "the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
not subject to waiver and a court should invoke the doctrine, if applicable, on its own
motion." Id. at 26.
15i167 F Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), motion for leave to file amended and
supplemental complaint denied, 167 F Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In this treble damage
action the plaintiff alleged that, as the result of a conspiracy among the defendants,
it was locked out of defendants' terminals and was subjected to demurrage penalties
and other unethical trade practices and wrongful conduct of the defendants. The court
held that if these charges were true they would constitute undue or unreasonable
prejudice under § 16 and unjust and unreasonable practices under § 17, over which
the agency has primary jurisdiction. The court therefore granted defendants' motion to
dismiss.

151240 F Supp. 581 (D. Puerto Rico 1965). The court granted a motion to dismiss
this civil action under the Sherman Act holding, without any discussion of the underlying
issues, that the Shipping Act "'stands in the way' of this Court's jurisdiction to enforce
the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which the plaintiffs invoke against the
defendants in the complaiit, and that, therefore, I must decline jurisdiction in favor of
the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Board." Id. at 582.
152260 F Supp. 858 (D. Puerto Rico 1966). The same court in the Maldonado
case reached the same conclusion, but stayed rather than dismissed because of Carnation.
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There was no discussion in these cases of whether the alleged
concerted action of the defendants was pursuant to an unfiled section 15 agreement. This was an important omission, because, if the
conduct of the defendants was covered by an approved section 15
agreement, the defendants' acts would have antitrust immunity, but
if the defendants were acting under an unapproved agreement, the
antitrust laws apply, as the Carnation decision made clear, and it
would be error to dismiss the treble damage action. Where the coinplaint charges antitrust violations, a determination must therefore be
made whether the antitrust exemption of the Shipping Act is applicable. If this cannot be done without reference to the Commission, the
primary jurisdiction doctrine should be applied to accomplish that
result. But the requirements for invoking the doctrine are not met
merely because some of the acts charged fall within the scope of the
Shipping Act. They may do so and also violate the antitrust laws.
However, even when the activity cannot be immunized the doctrine
may still be applicable if there are issues within the specialized competence of the agency which may have an important bearing on
153
the outcome of the antitrust proceeding.
If the acts charged in the antitrust proceeding are beyond the
scope of the Shipping Act, the primary jurisdiction doctrine is not
153 Maddock & Miller, Inc. v. United States Lines, 365 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1966).

This was a treble damage action m which it was alleged that the shipper defendants
threatened defendant United States Lines that they would ship via other carriers if
United States Lines did not purchase its chinaware requirements from one of the
defendants, and that as a result, United States Lines agreed to do so, thereby paying a
deferred rebate in violation of § 14 of the Shipping Act. It was contended that such
acts constituted a conspiracy m restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. Separate
counts alleged the receipt of a rebate by defendant U.S. Lines and a conspiracy under
the Sherman Act against all defendants. The acceptance of the rebate was alleged as
part of the conspiracy. The court concluded that whether the payment constituted a
rebate was for the Commission to decide, and also referred the Sherman Act count to the
Commission even though the alleged activity could not be immunized. The court held:
"Because it does not appear that this agreement could come under any protective umbrella of the Maritime Commission, a finding by a district court that the agreement
violated the Sherman Act would not seem to 'interfere with the Commission's exercise
of its lawful powers,' Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, supra, if that were
to be interpreted narrowly.
"But reference to an administrative agency is not restricted to situations when the
agency has the power to immunize, as the subsequent history of the Far East litigation
demonstrated when the court held the agency was without power to immunize the
dual system of rates under attack. Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S.
481, 78 S. Ct. 851, 2 L. Ed. 2d 926 (1958)
Whether the agreement to change suppliers constituted a rebate is not dispositive of the Sherman Act question but it may have
an inportant bearing on the issue." Ibid.
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applicable. 154 Where the conspiracy was between a steamship company and an air carrier not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction,
the doctrine was held inapplicable. 15" In controversies involving alleged multi-party conspiracies, the doctrine does not apply if the
concerted activity extends beyond that contemplated by the Shipping
Act and includes persons not subject to the act. "6
154 Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, 78 F Supp. 1, 8 (D. Hawaii 1948).
The court held that a complaint charging a conspiracy between an air carrier and a
water carrier to monopolize transportation between the Hawaiian Islands alleged matters
over which neither the Federal Maritime Commission nor the Civil Aeronautics Board
had jurisdiction. Relying on Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456-60 (1945),
the court held the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to be inapplicable in such circumstances.
'55 Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, supra note 154, at 8. The court distinguished the controversy before it from that of the Cunard case where all of the parties
were subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission and the agency had power to see that
its orders were enforced, stating, "the Maritime Commission lacks authority over the
control of Hawaiian by Inter-Island as § 15 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 814
does not affect agreements between water carers and air carriers, as air carriers are
not persons subject to that law." Id. at 4.
156 The Federal Maritime Commission and its predecessors have found that agreements between a person subject to the act and one who is not cannot be approved
under § 15. In the Matter of Wharfage Charges and Practices at Boston, Massachusetts, 2 U.S.M.C. 245, 251 (Dkt. No. 481, 1940); United States Gulf-Atlantic &
India, Ceylon and Burma Conference (Agreement No. 7620), 2 U.S.M.C. 749, 754
(Dkt. No. 635, 1945). In Grace Line, Inc. v. Skips A/S Viking Line, 7 F.M.C. 432, 449
(Dkt. Nos. 946, 950 & 953, 1962), the Commission stated: "Section 15 was enacted to
subject anticompetitive agreements between those engaged in specified maritime enterprises to the scrutiny of a regulatory agency, and to authorize that agency under stated
conditions to exempt such agreements from the operation of the antitrust laws, and this
it does. This agreement is not between parties specified by Section 15. Therefore Section
15 does not require that it be filed with and approved by the Commission nor can the
Commission, by approval, exempt it from the operation of the antitrust laws." In a preCunard decision, Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (2d Cir. 1921), an action by a shipper
against a carer, its agents and unions, alleging a conspiracy under the Sherman Act
to discriminate against plaintiffs goods, the court found an unlawful combination, and
enjoined the activities without mentionmg primary jurisdiction. The doctrine has, however, been applied where some of the parties were not subject to the Shipping Act. This
was the result in New York Lumber Trade Ass'n v. Lacey, 245 App. Div. 262, 281 N.Y.S.
647 (App. Div.), aff'd per curtam, 269 N.Y. 595, 199 N.E. 688 (1935), modified, 269
N.Y. 677, 200 N.E. 54, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 684 (1936) and United States v. Pacific
Lumber Co., No. 34859, N.D. Cal., July 31, 1956 (unreported opinion). The court in
the Lacey case, decided after Cunard, applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine to the
legality of certain terminal practices allegedly resulting from a conspiracy between
carrers, unions, agents and stevedores, although some members of the conspiracy were
not subject to the Shipping Act. The reasoning of the court was that if an order of the
agency aimed at the carriers were not adequate to dissolve the conspiracy, relief could
be obtained from a district court in an action to enforce the Board's order under §
29 by including in such enforcement proceedings all persons conspiring with the carriers.
281 N.Y.S. at 662. The Pacific Lumber case was an action by the Government under
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Section 15 Agreements
Prior to the decision in the Carnationcase, the lower courts, while
agreeing that the implementation of an unapproved section 15 agreement was unlawful under the Shipping Act, were divided on the
question of whether the failure to obtain approval subjected the
parties to the antitrust laws. 157 The matter has been settled by the
Carnationholding that the implementation of rate-making agreements
the Sherman Act to enjoin a conspiracy to restrain trade in the export of lumber. Despite
the fact that some of the defendants were not subject to the act, the court granted a
motion to dismiss, holding that the Far East Conference case was dispositive. However,
antitrust immunity applies only when the combination is acting under an agreement
approved by the Commission. The courts in the Lacey and Pacific Lumber cases did
not consider the question of immunity or lack of it, deciding merely that the acts were
of the type which fell within the terms of the Shipping Act and, concluding that since
they did, the doctrine applied.
However, the Court in Carnation stated "the Far East and Cunard principles permit
courts to subject activities wlch are clearly unlawful under the Shipping Act to antitrust sanctions so long as the courts refrain from taking action which might interfere with
the Commission's exercise of its lawful powers." Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound
Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 221 (1966). It would seem that antitrust sanctions are
applicable to concerted activity beyond the scope of the Shippmg Act with persons
not subject to the act because such conduct cannot be approved by the Commission.
Activities pursuant to such combinations cannot, therefore, be immunized and there
is no danger of interfering with any future action of the Commission. Cf. United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1939), where the authorization granted to agncultural producers by § 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 291
(1964), to associate to market their goods, did not give such persons the right to combine
with agricultural distributors and labor officials to restrain trade.
The fact that one or more of the alleged conspirators is not subject to the Shipping
Act should not, of itself, preclude the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
because the activity may still be within the scope of an approved agreement. Conferences,
for example, are permitted by their approved § 15 agreements between the member lines
to deal with persons such as shippers and travel agents who are not subject to the
Shippmg Act. Legitimate business activity between the conference members and shippers
or travel agents is therefore permitted by the conference agreement, and the doctrine
should apply to conduct arguably within the scope of such agreements. However, if
the conference members enter into agreements directly with the slppers or travel agents
(other than dual rate contracts with slppers which are expressly permitted by § 14b),
and combine with them to restrain or monopolize trade the activity ceases to become
arguably immune and the doctrine should be inapplicable.
'57 Compare Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub. nom, Japan-Atlantic & Gulf Conference v. United States, 347 U.S. 990
(1954) (dual rate contracts are subject to the antitrust laws unless approved) and
European Commer. Co. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 1923 A.M.C. 211, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) (to be a successful defense to a treble damage action the agreement
must be approved); with American Uion Transp. v. River Plate & Brazil Conferences,
126 F Supp. 91, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd per curiam on opinion below, 222 F.2d 369
(2d Cir. 1955) (the failure to file an agreement permits relief under § 22 of the Shipping Act but does not subject the offending parties to the antitrust laws).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

winch have not been approved by the Commission is subject to the
antitrust laws. 58
It may be difficult to determine, however, whether the conduct
charged is within the scope of an approved agreement. This situation
usually arises when conferences or other groups are operating under
basic agreements approved by the Commission, and a question arises
whether the conduct is encompassed by the agreement or constitutes
an independent, unapproved agreement subject to the antitrust laws.
When questions involving the legality of the conduct arise, the matter
should be referred to the Commission for deterination' 59 If the legality of the conduct has already been adjudicated by the Commission, the
doctrine is not applicable.160
Civil vs. Crnminal Proceedings
The first case to consider the effect of the Shipping Act on criminal
prosecutions under the antitrust laws was United States v. Alaska
S.S. Co.'61 This was a civil action brought by the Government to
15 8 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 216 (1966).
Apart from the antitrust implications of the failure to obtain approval of § 15
agreements, such agreements are unenforceable and therefore may not be made the
basis of an action for breach of contract. River Plate & Brazil Conferences v. Pressed Steel
Car Co., 227 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1955); Pacific Westbound Conference v. Leval & Co.,
201 Ore. 390, 396, 269 P.2d 541, 543-44, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954). In the
Pressed Steel case, the court held the primary jurisdiction doctnne may not be invoked
by the plaintiff in a breach of contract action when a failure to obtain § 15 approval is
asserted by the defendant. The rationale was that it is only necessary in a breach of
contract action to show the agreement was unlawful under the Shipping Act and therefore invalid and enforceable, but antitrust actions require a more extensive inquiry.
Cf. American Unon Transp. v. River Plate & Brazil Conferences, 126 F Supp. 91, 93
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd per curiam on opinwn below, 222 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1955) note
157 supra, where the same court as that which decided the Pressed Steel case, with two
of the same judges sitting on the panel, held, relying on Cunard, that the primary
jurisdiction doctrine applies in a treble damage action even though the agreement was
not approved.
159 See United States v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 141 F Supp. 396, 397 (N.D.
Cal. 1955), and Anglo Canadian Co. v. Haley, No. 38695, N.D. Cal., July 28, 1960
(unreported opinion) (action for breach of dual rate contract, and counterclan for
treble damages for failure to obtain approval of contract. Stay granted.) The test
applied by Carnation to determine whether referral to the agency is necessary in treble
damage actions is whether the conduct is arguably lawful under the Shipping Act.
Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 222 (1966). A "substantial", "persuasive", or similar showing of legality should not be necessary because
if the court requires such a showing before it will refer the question to the agency it is
intruding upon the authority of the Commission to adjudge initially the validity of all
agreements, whatever may be their form. See United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.,
284 U.S. 474, 487 (1932).
160 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. American President Lanes, Ltd., 1966 A.M.C.
2595, 2599 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
161110 F Supp. 104 (W.D. Wash. 1952).
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enjoin an alleged conspiracy between a steamship company and five of
its officers to restrain and destroy competition in the Alaska trade,
and a criminal prosecution against the same defendants for the
alleged conspiracy Defendants invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine by motions to dismiss, but it was urged by the Government that
the doctrine was applicable only in civil actions, such as the Far East
Conference case, and not where criminal actions are involved as
well. The court rejected any distinction between criminal prosecutions
and civil actions, stating, "all the arguments in favor of letting an
experienced administrative board exercise its primary jurisdiction
applies with equal force in a criminal case as in a civil case. The
rationale applicable to the two types of action is the same." 62 Guided
by the discussion in the FarEast Conference case regarding the merits
of dismissal versus stay, and following the result in that case, the
district court dismissed both the indictment and the civil complaint.
In doing so, the court overlooked the fact that in Cunard and Far East
Conference, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, whereas the indictment in the Alaska S.S. case complained of past conduct, a distinction
which, as Carnationshows, is of significant Importance.
The question next arose in In the Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of the Shpping Indus.,1 63 an investigation of possible criminal
offenses in the shipping industry stemming from the findings of the
Celler Committee in its investigation of the industry 164 Subpoenas
were issued for the production of certain information, and motions to
quash were filed. The contention was made by certain of the moving
parties that, in view of the Alaska S.S. case, any indictments returned
could not be upheld, and therefore the court should decide the jurisdictional question at the outset to avoid a lengthy investigation to
no purpose. The court ruled that the primary jurisdiction question
was premature. The appropriate time to consider the question of
primary jurisdiction would be upon the return of an indictment. To
do so before then would be to "interpose the admmistrative agency
between the grand jury (the so-called conscience of the community)
and its investigation, by applying to the grand jury the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction."1 65
The Alaska S.S. decision was distinguished on the ground that
there the court had an indictment before it in its consideration of the
primary jurisdiction question. However, the court added that the
162 Id. at Ill.
163 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).

164 See note 14 supra.
165 186 F Supp. 298, 310 (D.D.C. 1960).
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Alaska S.S. case "may have gone further by dismissing the indictment
than would a court in this jurisdiction in a similar case." 166 Although
it acknowledged that the primary jurisdiction doctrine may be applied
to both civil and criminal actions, the court said, "it is more forceful
in the civil regulatory type actions than in criminal actions, for in the
latter actions the violations of other federal statutes may more often
be involved, and the regulatory scheme less affected."' 6
The effect of the dismissal of the indictment in the Alaska S.S.
case was a holding that the Shipping Act superseded the criminal
provisions of the antitrust laws as applied to the shipping industry
The doctrine of pro tanto repeal by implication was applied, rather
than the principle of primary jurisdiction, which would have stayed
the action pending an administrative determination of the legality
of the defendants' conduct. When conduct is arguably lawful under
the Shipping Act because it may fall within the scope of an approved
section 15 agreement, an administratve determination must be made
to avoid any conflict between the court and the Commission. The risk
of such conflict, where the activity is of debatable legality, is present
in criminal and civil actions under the antitrust laws, since if the conduct proves to be lawful under section 15 it receives antitrust inmunity, criimal as well as civil. The primary jurisdiction doctrine
thus has a definite place in criminal antitrust prosecutions in the
shipping industry, as well as in civil actions. The application of the
doctrine operates to stay, not oust, the court's jurisdiction. This will
avoid the result of the Alaska S.S. case, which, viewed in the light of
the Carnation decision, should have been a stay, rather than a dismissal.'

68

Treble Damages vs. Injunction: to Stay or to Dismiss
Before the decision in the Carnationcase, the lower courts, in applying the doctrine, made no distinction between treble damage suits
and criminal prosecutions for past activity on the one hand, and actions for injunctive relief for continuing conduct on the other. In each
166 id. at 309.
167 Id. at 309. Cf. United States v. American Union Transp., Inc., 232 F Supp. 700,

702 (D.N.J. 1964) (dictum), stating that the doctrine is applicable to criminal prosecutions as well as to civil actions.
16s Cf. United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913), m
which an indictment charged violations of the Sherman Act and the Interstate Commerce
Act. The primary jurisdiction doctrine was held inapplicable to the Sherman Act counts,
but at the time of the decision, there was no immunity provision under the Interstate
Commerce Act similar to § 15. The conduct was therefore not arguably exempt from the
antitrust laws.
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type of action a dismissal was thought appropriate. 69 The Carnation
decision placed injunction actions and suits for treble damages on
different grounds. A suit for injunctive relief against continuing
conduct can easily be reinstituted if the Commission finds the conduct
violates the Shipping Act and is unapprovable, the Court observed
in that case, but a treble damage action for past conduct cannot because of the likelihood of its being barred by the statute of limitations. 7 0

A dismissal of a treble damage action was reversed in Maddock
& Miller, Inc. v. United States Lines,171 decided subsequent to the
Carnationcase. The court of appeals applied the Carnationrule and
found that the lower court should have stayed plaintiffs treble damage
cause of action instead of dismissing it.1'2 Also, in Carlos Crespo
169 United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110 F Supp. 104 (W.D. Wash. 1952) (civil
action for injunction and criminal prosecution); American Umon Transp., Inc. v. River
Plate & Brazil Conferences, 126 F Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd per curiam on
optnion below, 222 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1955) (treble damage action); Rivoli Trucking
Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 167 F Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (treble damage
action); Maldonado v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240 F Supp. 581 (D. Puerto Rico 1965)
(treble damage action); United States v. Pacific Lumber Co., No. 34859, N.D. Cal.,
July 31, 1956 (unreported opiion) (dismissal of government's civil action -to enjoin
conspiracy in restraint of trade in export of lumber). Cf. Anglo Canadian Shipping
Co. v. Haley, No. 38695, N.D. Cal., July 28, 1960 (unreported opinion) (stay of counterclaim for treble damages for failure to obtain approval of dual rate contract).
170 383 U.S. at 223. Actually there may be no need to reinstitute injunctive proceedings because, as stated in Far East Conference, if the Commission holds the conduct
unlawful and unapprovable, and orders it discontinued, its order may be enforced by
suit in a district court under § 29 of the Slippmg Act. Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570, 577 (1952).
171 365 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1966).
172The court of appeals held the Carnation decision indicated that another count of
the plaintiffs complaint, alleging that one of the defendants received a rebate in violation of the Shippmg Act, should also have been stayed rather than dismissed because the
two year period for recovering reparations under the Shipping Act bad expired during
the pendency of the suit. The court believed that to insure the plaintiff a fall and
adequate remedy if the Commission found a violation of the Shipping Act, the district
court should have retained jurisdiction of the Shipping Act cause of action also. 365
F.2d at 102. Thus where the period of limitations of the regulatory statute expires during
the court proceeding, a stay protects the plaintiffs right to a full measure of relief.
However, since the proper course at least in non-antitrust cases is to stay the action when
the controversy is referred to the agency, the circuit court in Maddock & Miller need
not have required an expiration of the regulatory period of limitations to reverse the
lower court's dismissal of the rebate count. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
Momsdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvama R.R., 230 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1913), suggests a
different result where the regulatory period of limitations expired prior to the institution
of the suit. There the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's tariff rule governing the
allotment of coal cars was discriminatory. The Court ruled that the issue of whether the
rule was discriminatory was within the primary jurisdiction of the ICC, but dismissed
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Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,17 3 motions to dismiss were

denied and the action stayed, following the Carnationrule.
Application of Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Cases
General Applicability of Doctrine
The primary jurisdiction guidelines of the Cunard and Far East

Conference decisions, although formulated in an antitrust context,
have been applied by the lower courts in the non-antitrust shipping
cases. The test is whether the controversy involves questions requiring
for their resolution the Commission's specialized knowledge of the
shipping industry, or issues which should be referred to the Commission to ensure uniformity in the regulation of the industry

4

The record shows, however, that this principle, like many others,
is easier to state than to apply In the following paragraphs, specific
instances m which the primary jurisdiction doctrine has been applied
the action because the two year period of limitations of the Interstate Commerce Act
had expired prior to the filing of the complaint. Cf. United States v. Western Pac. R.R.,
352 U.S. 59, 72-73 (1956), where the Court held that even after the expiration of the
regulatory period of limitations, reference to the ICC of questions raised solely by way
of defense and within the primary jurisdiction of the agency is appropriate.
173 260 F Supp. 858 (D. Puerto Rico 1966). Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. V.
American President Lines, Ltd., 1966 A.M.C. 2595, 2599 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), holding that
the stay directed in Carnation is not controlling in a treble damage action in which
the plaintiff requires extensive discovery proceedings. The case involved the same interconference activity as that of the Carnation case, but the plamtiff here was not a party
to the adminimstrative proceeding as was the plaintiff in Carnation.The court held that
while the appeal from the agency's decision was being resolved, the plamtiff could
continue with discovery, and if trial approached before a final determination of the
appeal, the defendant could renew his motion for a stay. The court stated "it is not the
pendency of an action which creates danger of a conflict between Court and Commission;
it is the making by the Court (whether with or without a jury) of a decision on the
merits." Id. at 2599. The court distinguished Carnation on the ground that there the
plaintiff had participated in the agency proceedings and did not need any further discovery in the antitrust proceeding. However, the stay was ordered in Carnation because
the conduct was arguably lawful, as were the defendants' activities in the Firestone
case because of the pending appeal of the administrative decision. This being the case,
the defendants should not be put to the defense of an antitrust action when their
conduct may later be found to be immune. The decision whether or not to stay a treble
damage action should depend upon whether the activity is arguably lawful and not
upon the plaintiffs discovery needs.
i74 Roberto Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsgesellschaft, M.B.H., 116
F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noa., Compama Espanola de Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. v. Roberto Hernandez, Inc., 313 U.S. 582-83 (1941); Orleans Materials &
Equip. Co. v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 213 F Supp. 325, 329-30 (E.D. La.), modified, 218
F Supp. 322 (1963); Ackerman Importing Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 2d 595,
601, 394 P.2d 566, 570 (1964); D. L. Piazza Co. v. West Coast Line, 119 F Supp. 937,
940 (N.D. IMI.1953) (alternative holding).
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or rejected by the lower courts are illustrated, as well as cases where
the application of the doctrine, or at least its discussion, was suggested
but the controversy was disposed of with no reference to primary
jurisdiction. A review of the situations wich required, or at least
received, different treatment will illustrate the part the doctrine has
played in the non-antitrust shipping cases.
The Doctrine Applied
Matters involving the interpretation of tariffs on fie with the
Commission are within the primary jurisdiction doctrine if a consideration of factors underlying the tariff is necessary175 However,
where the Comussion has already construed the tariff provision in
controversy, no reference to the agency is necessary 7"The doctrine
is also applicable in actions involving a determination of the lawfulness and reasonableness of tariff charges, 177 and the validity of tariff
exculpatory provisions. 178
Where the issue is whether rates charged by a carrier are unjustly
discriminatory, the matter is for the Commission to decide.'7 The
175 Orleans Materials & Equip. Co. v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 213 F Supp. 325, 331
(E.D. La.), modified, 218 F Supp. 322 (1963). The issue, according to the court, is
whether the controversy involves a mere matter of construction as in Great No. Ry. v.
Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922), or is a matter for expert interpretation
such as involved in United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
17
6 Ken Royce, Inc., v. Pacific Transp. Lines, Inc., Admiralty No. 25527, N.D.
Cal., August 25, 1952 (unreported opinion). The court's decision was reached in an
unusual manner. The libelant sought to recover alleged excessive freight charges.
Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the issues had already been adjudicated
by the Commission. At a special hearing, it was stipulated that the court should rule
on the issue, treating the libel as a de novo action in admiralty, not as a review of the
decision of the Commission. The court found that the resolution of libelant's contractual
rights depended upon an interpretation of a maritime tariff, a function vested in the
Commission. Declining to hold that the decision of the Commission was res ;udicata of
the issue, the court concluded that the agency's determination had the effect of settling
libelant's contractual rights, with the result that the alleged contractual right of the
libelant failed, for lack of foundation, and nothing remained but to dismiss the libel.
A different approach leading to the same result is suggested by the opinion in United
States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 69 (1956), where the court stated there would
be no need to refer the matter to the agency if it had already construed the particular
tariff, or had clarified the factors underlying it. Using this less convoluted approach, the
district court would have applied the Commission's definition of the tariff to the libelant's
claim and dismissed the libel. This was the procedure followed in Burroughs Corp. v.
Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 4 P & F Ship. Reg. Rep. 21,039, 21,040 (Sup. Ct., N.Y., Ctry.
1967).
177Port of Bandon v. Oliver J. Olson & Co., 175 F Supp. 736, 741 (D. Ore. 1959)
(lawfulness of port charge covering services alleged by respondent to be fictitious).
178 Bird v. S.S. Fortuna, 262 F Supp. 24, 27 (D. Mass. 1966); Ackerman Importing
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 2d 595, 394 P.2d 566, 571 (1964).
179 D. L. Piazza Co. v. West Coast Line, Inc., 119 F Supp. 937, 940 (N.D. Ill.
1953) (alternative holding).
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doctrine is also applicable to a carrier's alleged refusal to provide
available cargo space, a matter which involves factual questions relating to the correct methods of stowing the cargo in question.'80
'In one case the primary jurisdiction doctrine was applied to a
determination of whether a carrier's purchase of supplies from a
shipper constituted a rebate to that shipper.' 8' That determination
"may well depend on an appraisal of the economic effect upon the
carrier's shipping rates of the price paid for the tied supplies; this
in turn may require an inquiry into the profit earned on the chinaware
82
and whether it significantly alters the cost of shipping on the line."'
The court also stated that a holding that a carrier's agreement to
purchase supplies from a shipper is a rebate might have widespread
impact upon the whole regulatory scheme, and the matter is better
left to the Commission. However, the granting of a rebate may involve
a simple transaction. Since common carriers by water are required
to publish and observe uniform tariff rates, kick-back payments to a
shipper by a carrier or reduced billings which result in cut rates, are
so obviously rebates that no expertise seems required to classify them
as such. Rebates are unconditionally prohibited by the Shipping Act,
and there is no problem of possible immunity Only when the facts
involve subtle practices, unlike the direct payment of money or other
obvious devices, should recourse to the Commission be necessary
to determine whether the transaction amounts to a rebate.
The doctrine also applies to the lawfulness of an embargo, which
requires analysis by a single tribunal constituted to pass on such
questions in order to ensure uniformity in the inpact of the embargo
on the public. 83 In two related cases the doctrine was applied to
controversies involving whether conduct constituted the use of fight4
ing ships.18
1S0 Robert Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsgesellschaft, M.B.H., 116
F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. iora., Compama Espanola de Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. v. Roberto Hernandez, Inc., 313 U.S. 582-83 (1941).
181Maddock & Miller, Inc. v. United States Line, 365 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1966).
i82 Ibid.
183 See Holt Motor Co. v. Nicholson Umversal S.S. Co., 56 F Supp. 585, 591-92
(D. Minn. 1944) (dictum). The court held that the matter was one which should be
determined by the agency, but proceeded to resolve the question in the carrier's favor
after assuming, for the purposes of disposing of the matter, that the court had lunsdiction to decide the issue. The court's decision on the merits set up a risk of conflict with the
exercise of the agency's jurisdiction over the embargo in a possible subsequent proceeding.
384 Wisconsin & Mich. Transp. Co. v. Pere Marquette Line Steamers, 210 Wis. 391,
396, 245 N.W 671, 673 (1932); Wisconsin & Mich. Transp. Co. v. Pere Marquette
Line Steamers, 67 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1933).
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The Doctrine Rejected
In the following situations the courts considered the primary
jurisdiction doctrine and rejected its application to the particular

controversy involved.
The doctrine is not applicable to grand jury proceedings. 85 Also,
where provisions of dual rate contract clauses are used in a general
commercial sense, their interpretation is not a matter on which the
Commission has special competence, and the doctrine would not be
applicable to controversies involving such interpretations. 86 Dual
rate contracts are complex, however, and construing them may require
an exammation and analysis of a variety of transportation factors
underlying the particular terminology used, a task for which the
Comnussion is better suited than the courts. 8 7 An action to enforce

an arbitration provision of a dual rate contract is not within the
primary jurisdiction of the Commission. 88
Where the Commission had no original jurisdiction over the controversy because it related to a tramp vessel not subject to the Shipping Act, the primary jurisdiction doctrine was not applicable. 189 Nor
was it applicable where the plaintiff had no remedy under the Shipping Act against the defendant because the latter was not subject to
the act. 9 °
185 See In the Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F
Supp. 298, 311 (D.D.C. 1960). The court, after holding the doctrine inapplicable, did
not entirely foreclose the application of the doctrine to all grand jury proceedings, but
stated that any such application would be rare. Ibid. In view of the fact that grand
jury investigations are limited to inquiries of probable violations of crnmal law, rather
than the enforcement of such laws, the doctrine would not seem to have any applicability
until the grand jury concludes its deliberations, at which time charges, if any, can be
analyzed to determine whether there is a likelihood of conflict with the agency's jurisdiction if8 6judicial proceedings are instituted.
'
See Anglo Canadian Sipping Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 405, 414 n.15 (9th
Cir. 1959).
87
'
See United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 65-67 (1956).
188 Joseph Amelar, Inc. v. Far East Conference, 229 F Supp. 450-51 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); In the Matter of Pasch, 26 Misc. 2d 925, 928, 210 N.Y.S.2d 738, 743 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cty. 1960), aff'd, 13 App. Div. 2d 470, 214 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1961). In American
President Lines, Ltd. v. S. Woolman, Inc., 239 F Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the court
granted the motion to compel arbitration with no discussion of prnnary jurisdiction.
189 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. S.S. Anghyra, 157 F Supp. 737, 752
(E.D. Va. 1957).
100 See Prince Line, Ltd. v. American Paper Exports, Inc., 55 F.2d 1053, 1056 (2d
Cir. 1932) (alternative holding). Plaintiff carrier knowingly received falsely classified
goods from defendant shipper, as the result of winch defendant obtained transportation
at rates less than those otherwise applicable, in violation of § 16. Plaintiff's conduct did
not bar hun from recovering the difference between the tariff rate and the rate actually
charged. The primary jurisdiction doctrine was held inapplicable because the defendant,
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The Doctrine Ignored
In the following cases involving violations or alleged violations of
the laws administered by the Commission, there was no discussion of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, although the application of the
doctrine, or at least a discussion of it, was suggested by the subject
matter of the controversy and by decisions in other cases dealing with
similar controversies.
In a series of cases involving the question of whether contracts
under which a shipper is granted a rate other than that established
under the carrier's tariff are unlawful, the primary jurisdiction doctrine was not discussed. 191 Other controversies in which the doctrine
was not mentioned were a construction of a carrer's tariff provision
relating to the right to discharge cargo at alternative locations where
a shipper, was not subject to the Shipping Act, and therefore plaintiff could not bring
an action for reparations under § 22 against defendant since such action may be brought
only against parties subject to the act. However, the agency has suggested that while
shippers are not subject to the act, the express subjection of shippers to § 16 may also
subject them to reparations proceedings for violations of § 16. Aluminum Prods., Inc. v.
Trans-Caribbean Motor Transp., Inc., 5 F.M.B. 1, 2 n.1 (Dkt. No. 763, 1956). Cf.
Dampskibsselskabet Torin A/S v. P. L. Thomas Paper Co., 26 App. Div. 347, 274
N.Y.S.2d 601 (1966), where, on facts similar to the Prince Line case, the court held that
the doctrine was inapplicable, not because the defendant shipper was not subject to the
act, but because no expertise was required for the determination of the illegality under
§ 16 of the false billing practices in question.
191 nAmbler v. Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills, 68 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1933); Belmont Iron Works v. Pacific Coast Direct Line, Inc., 249 App. Div. 156, 291 N.Y.S. 360
(1936); Sands v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 163 Misc. 757, 296 N.Y.S. 590 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
Cty. 1937). All three cases cited Prince Line, Ltd. v. American Paper Exports, Inc., 55
F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1932), which held such contracts destroy equality among
shippers and are unlawful. See note 190 supra. However, in the Prince Line case,
primary jurisdiction was held inapplicable because the plaintiff had no recourse under
the Shipping Act against the defendant shipper, who was not subject to the act. In the
Belmont and Sands cases the shipper was the plaintiff, and this jurisdictional bar was not
present, because persons not subject to the Shipping Act may institute reparations proceedings under § .2 if the defendant is subject to the act. Rivoli Trucking Corp. v. New
York Shipping-Assn, 167 F Supp. 940, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), motion for leave to file
amended and supplemental complaint denied, 167 F Supp. 943 (1957). However, even
though a Shipping Act remedy existed in the Belmont and Sands cases, a controversy
in which a single shipper is granted a special rate less than that otherwise applicable to
the commodity under the carrier's tariff, requires no specialized knowledge of the
shipping industry. Since such transactions are unqualifiedly prohibited by the Shipping
Act, the inquny is limited to a determination of the tariff rate, and a finding that a
cheaper rate was granted to the shipper. This does not necessarily rule out the application of the doctrine in all cases under § 16 involving alleged unfair devices to allow
transportation at less than the regular rates. Such devices may be more subtle than
offering cut rates, and their treatment may require tariff construction or an evaluation
of involved shipping practices auned at reducing freight charges. The Commission's
specialized knowledge would materially assist the court m the resolution of such controversies.
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a strike had tied up the scheduled pier, 19 2 a ruling that a special contract of affreightment did not constitute an unfair or unjustly discriminatory cargo space accommodation contract with a supper under
section 14,193 a finding of illegal overcharges resulting from a false
certificate,"9 a determination that an oral waiver of the one year
period of limitations of the Carnage of Goods by Sea Act 95 would
not be a discriminatory contract or arrangement to give the libelant
an unreasonable preference over other shippers in violation of sections
14 and 16,196 and a holding that the activities of a steamship company
did not constitute a common carnage operation.197
In analyzing these decisions it would seem that an interpretation
of tariff language which is not used in any peculiar or techical sense
and a controversy concerning illegal overcharges based upon clearly
false certificates, are not questions requiring the judgment of a
body of experts familiar with the shipping industry Also, whether
waivers of time limitation provisions of one statute violate regulatory
provisions of another statute are more suitable for resolution by a
court than the agency charged with the duty of enforcing the regulatory statute. However, a determination of whether an affreightment
contract unjustly discriminates between shippers in the matter
of cargo space accommodations under section 14 may involve complex
considerations, two of which, the proper loading of the vessel and
the available tonnage, are specifically mentioned in section 14. This
section allows certain latitude because it prohibits only contracts
which "unjustly" discriminate and does not outlaw all discrimination
in such matters. Whether discrimination has reached the point of
being unjust is a question which the Commission, rather than a court,
is better equipped to answer. The same is true of controversies revolving a determination of whether activities of a steamship line
constitute common carriage by water.
Other Complementary 'Roles of Court and Commission
The discussion thus far has been concerned with defining the
areas in which, through the application of the doctrine of primary
192 Bull-InsuIar Line v. National Sugar Ref. Co., 180 F Supp. 216 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
'93 Copper River Packing Co. v. Alaska S.S. Co., 22 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1927); R. L.
Heflin, Inc. v. Texas Oceanic S.S. Co., 53 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App., 1932).
194 United States v. Garcia & Diaz, Inc., 291 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1961).
195 49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1964).
196 The Argentino. Buxton S.A.N. Redeir, 28 F Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
197 United States v. Stephen Bros. Line, 4 P & F Ship. Reg. Rep. 20,864, 20,866
(S.D. Fla. 1966).
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jurisdiction, the administrative function complements the judicial
process. There are, conversely, other areas in which the integrity of
the regulatory scheme requires that judicial proceedings be utilized
to supplement agency jurisdiction. Suits to recover Shipping Act
penalties and to aid the Commission's jurisdiction are means by which
court jurisdiction augments the administrative function and promotes
effective regulation. The question of the applicability of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine has often arisen in these proceedings. Whether
the doctrine has any function in this type of litigation will be discussed in this section.
Judicial Enforcement of Shtpping Act Penalties
Section 15, relating to the filing of agreements between carriers,
conferences of carriers and other persons subject to the act, contains
the following penalty provision: "Whoever violates any provision of
this section or of section 813a of this title shall be liable to a penalty
of not more than $1,000 for each day such violation continues, to be
recovered by the United States in a civil action."ies In such civil actions, the primary jurisdiction doctrine, although urged, has not been
applied.
The Government filed section 15 penalty actions in United States
v. Ditlev-Simonsen Lines;199 United States v. Federal Steam Nav.
Co.; 200 and United States v. Anchor Line, Ltd.20 1 In each case a motion to dismiss on primary Jurisdiction grounds was denied. The courts
found that no expertise was required to determine whether the
defendants had complied with the statute. The Ditlev-Simonsen and
Anchor Line opinions emphasized the fact that the penalty provision
of section 15 requires the fine to be recovered in a "civil action," which
could only mean a court suit, not a proceeding before the Comnmission. Anchor Line distinguished the antitrust cases on the ground they
involve complicated issues.
Before discussing the principle of these cases, the holding in
United States v. American Union Transp., Inc.,102 should be considered. That was a criminal proceeding charging that a carrier, its
19s 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964). As of the time of the

1959 hearings of the Celler Committee's investigation of the shipping industry, no proceeding had ever been instituted to enforce this penalty provision. CELIXR REPoT 36061. See note 14 supra.
1994 P & F Ship. Reg. Rep. 20,832 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
200 P & F Ship. Reg. Rep. 20,910 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
201 257 F Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
20 2
232 F Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1964).
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agents and a skipper were guilty of violating the criminal provisions of
section 16, which specify that a violation of that section is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine. The information charged that the
carrier, through its agents, knowingly accepted the shipper's allegedly
false measurements, as a result of which the carrier allowed the
shipper to obtain transportation at less than the applicable rates and
thereby gave him an undue and unreasonable preference over other
shippers, in violation of section 16. On defendants' motion to dismiss
based on primary jurisdiction, the court conceded that the doctrine
20 3
was applicable to crimmal prosecutions as well as to civil actions,
but stated that nothing in the Shipping Act gave the Commission
the power to determine the guilt or innocence of any person charged
with a violation of the criminal provisions of the act, or the power
to impose a penalty for such violations. "The Conmussion has no
power to regulate such conduct because it is specifically prohibited
by the statute. The Commission's regulatory power would in no way
be affected by a prosecution seeking to punish past violations of the
Act" 204 The Pacific & Arctic case, in which the doctrine was applied
to the counts alleging violations of the criminal provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, was distinguished on the ground that it involved
a single large conspiracy and presented complicated factual issues
requiring the experience of the Commission before criminal charges
were prosecuted. A determination of whether the alleged conduct
violated section 16 was "a sinple question of law-the interpretation
of the intent of the statute-and, on this question, the experience of
the Commission is irrelevant.2 5
The opinions in the section 15 fines cases appear to exclude all
application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine to such suits. In doing
so, the dual nature of these penalty proceedings is overlooked. It is
true that the recovery of a section 15 penalty requires a judicial, rather
than an agency, proceeding. However, the assessment of the fine
is predicated upon a showing that section 15 has been violated, and
as to that aspect of the case the doctrine has utility If, for example,
203 Citing United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106-08
(1913); United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110 F Supp. 104, 111 (W.D. Wash. 1952);
In the Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of the Steamship Indus., 186 F Supp. 298, 309

(D.D.C. 1960).
204 232 F Supp. at 703.
205 Id. at 704. Cf. United States v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 208 F Supp.
957 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), involving an information charging a violation of § 16 by a earner
and its agents in knowingly permitting a shipper to obtain transportation at other than
regular rates by an unjust device. Primary jurisdiction was not mentioned.
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the court were faced with the question of determining whether the
alleged conduct of the defendants went beyond the scope of an
approved agreement and therefore involved the implementation of
an unapproved agreement, difficult factual questions may be involved,
relating to the scope and operation of the approved agreement, on
wich the Commission's views would be valuable. A finding by the
court that the activity exceeded the scope of the approved agreement
and a resulting assessment of fines might conflict with a subsequent
proceeding before the Commission in which the agency might determine that the approved agreement was sufficiently broad to encompass the activities of the defendants. °6
Moreover, while antitrust proceedings admittedly are complex,
the issues referred to the Commission in such cases are not antitrust
issues, but ordinarily relate only to whether or not the activities
charged are within the scope of approved agreements. Tins may be
the same type of issue requiring resolution in a section 15 penalty
case before the penalty can be assessed by the court, and the need
for a referral to the Commission in the one instance is as compelling
207
as it is in the other.
As to the enforcement of the criminal provisions of section 16, the
American Unon Transp. case involved ten alleged instances of know206 "The plaintiffs in the Cunard and Far East Cases were seeking to enjoin activities which allegedly implemented unapproved agreements even though the Commission
had never determined whether those alleged activities constituted the implementation of
unapproved agreements. There was a real risk that the District Court might find that the
defendants had implemented unapproved agreements while the Commission might find
in some later proceeding that the same activities constituted the implementation of
approved agreements. This Court decided that the danger of such a conflict could best
be avoided by holding that one tribunal or the other has the exclusive right to make the
initial factual determination. Since the Commission has specialized knowledge of the
mdustry, the Court concluded that such primary ]urisdiction should be vested in the
Commrision and accordingly instructed the District Court to refrain from acting until
the Commission had ascertained and interpreted the circumstances underlying the legal
issues." Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1968).
207 Of course, if there is no approved agreement arguably encompassing the defendants' activities, and the circumstances merely involve enterng into an agreement
covered by § 15 without Commission approval, no intricate questions of fact need be
resolved to predicate the recovery of penalties under § 15. And where the Commission
has already determined that the defendants' conduct violates § 15, no referral is necessary
in a subsequent penalty proceeding, since the court already has the views of the Commission, and the agency's task has been completed. The test should be whether the
conduct is arguably lawful. Where the doctrine is applied, proceedings should be
stayed rather than dismissed. Penalty cases, like treble damage actions, are based on past
conduct, and the assessment of the penalty will not interfere with any future action by
the Commission. Also, the statute of limitations may expire before the Commission makes
its determination, thus barring a subsequent proceeding.
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ing acceptance by the carrier of the shipper's allegedly false measurements. The court found nothing in such a factual situation requiring
the assistance of the Commission, and where false billing, classification, weighing and reporting practices are concerned, that would
frequently be the case. No expertise would ordinarily be required to
establish these false practices, and there is no danger of upsetting
the uniformity of the regulatory scheme because, unlike conduct
under section 15, such practices are prohibited under all circumstances. os
This does not mean, however, that the doctrine has no place in
section 16 crimunal proceedings. Some arrangements designed to
obtain transportation at less than the regular rates might be more
involved, and their determination might require tariff construction
or the evaluation of industry practices intended to reduce freight
charges, as to which the Commission's specialized knowledge would
be of aid. Section 16 also prohibits common carriers and other persons
covered by the act from subjecting "any particular person, locality, or
description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."20 9 Here some measure of
latitude is permitted. Prejudice and disadvantage are allowed, and
it is only when they become "undue or unreasonable" that they are
prohibited. The Commission, with its peculiar knowledge of conditions existmg in the industry, perhaps justifying some prejudice or
disadvantage, is better able to determine whether, in the circumstances of the case, the prejudice or disadvantage is "undue or unreasonable" In a criminal action seeking penalties for a violation of
this provision of section 16, a determination by the Commission that
the conduct had exceeded the latitude permitted would be of substantial benefit to the court.21 °
208

The relatively uncomplicated proof ordinarily required to establish such false
practices under § 16 results m four possible proceedings which are available to obtain
relief: the Commssion may institute an investigation to order that the carrer and/or
the shipper cease and desist from continuing such practices, Hohenberg Bros. Co. v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1963); a § 22 proceeding may be
brought before the Commission by a party in]ured by the practices, Port Comm'n v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 3 F.M.B. 556 (Dkt. No. 675, 1951); a ]udicial proceeding may be
filed to recover damages resulting from the practices, Prince Line, Ltd. v. American
Paper Exports, Inc., 55 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1932); Dampskibsselskabet Torm A/S v.
P. L. Thomas Paper Co., 26 App. Div. 347, 274 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1966); or a criminal
prosecution may be instituted to enforce the penalty provisions of § 16, U.S. v. Peninsular
& Occidental S.S. Co., 208 F Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. American
Union Transp., Inc., 232 F Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1964).
209 39 Stat. 734 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1964).
210 As in the § 15 penalty cases, the doctrine, when applicable to a § 16 criminal

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

Judicial Proceedings to Maintam the Status Quo
The prinary jurisdiction doctrine has been asserted in judicial
proceedings which seek to preserve the status quo pending action by
the Commission. The doctrine is not applicable to such proceedings
because the relief sought will aid rather than interfere with the exercise
of the Commission's jurisdiction.
The leading case is West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc.,211 in which the defendant carrier announced proposed rate cuts
in its service from New Orleans to Havana. Plaintiff, a competing
carrier, filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging that the
proposed rate reductions were unlawful. With the approval of the
Commission, plaintiff brought an action in the district court seeking
to enjoin defendant from putting its rate reductions into effect pending the Commission's decision. The Commission thereafter petitioned
to intervene in the judicial proceeding, alleging that the complaint
it received from plaintiff showed a prima facie case for the exercise of
its jurisdiction, and that unless the status quo were maintained, the
agency might be unable to protect private and public interests which
might be adversely affected by the proposed rate reductions. In holding that an injunction was proper, the court of appeals distinguished
the Cunard case, stating that Cunard "imposed limitations on the
power of the courts to interfere with the exercise of an administrative
agency's powers. Here the court was asked to assist the Commission
by preserving the status quo until it could determine whether it had
statutory jurisdiction, and, if so, how it should act."12 This is the
essential distinction between the primary jurisdiction cases and those
seeking to preserve the status quo pending an admmistratve deter21
mination. a

Injunctive relief has been granted to maintain the status quo
pending the agency's adjudication of the legality of conference agreeaction, should operate only to stay the proceeding. A dismissal would be inappropriate
because past conduct is involved and an assessment of a fine will not interfere with any
future Commission action. Also, the expiration of the statute of limitations is of concern.
211 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. dismissed, 336 U.S. 908 (1949).
212 Id. at 779.
213 Cunard and Far East Conference were distinguished in Pennsylvama Motor
Truck Ass'n v. Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal Ass'n, 183 F Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa.
1960), on the ground that they hold district courts have no jurisdiction in antitrust suits
to determine the legality of agreements. "Such issues are within the exclusive competence
and primary jurisdiction of the expert administrative agency-the Federal Maritime
Board. But, in those cases there was no question raised as to the propriety of the Court
in issuing an injunction to hold the matter in status quo." Id. at 915-16.
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ments, 214- and to enjoin the enforcement of tariff amendments pending

the Commission's determination of their legality 2

5

Summary and Conclusions
The impact of the primary jurisdiction doctrine is most widely

felt m accommodating the antitrust and regulatory laws. Unlike the
principle of repeals by implication, primary jurisdiction does not require a finding that the antitrust laws have been displaced. The
doctrine is invoked when activity prohibited by the antitrust laws
may arguably be inmumzed by the regulatory statute, and an admimstrative determination of that issue is required before the question
of antitrust liability is resolved. In some instances, repeals by implication have been found under the guise of primary jurisdiction. The
distinction between the two principles should, however, be kept in
mind because the decision of whether or not to apply the primary
jurisdiction doctrine may be influenced by the court's mistaken belief
that to do so would require that the suit be dismissed. Rather than
apply the doctrine with such harsh consequences a conclusion might be
reached that the doctrine does not apply to the controversy
The primary jurisdiction doctrine is applicable in treble damage
antitrust shipping cases when the activity is arguably within the
scope of an approved agreement. Only the protection of section 15
can prevent the application of the antitrust laws. However, even
where the activity cannot be immunized, issues within the specialized
competence of the Commission may be referred to the agency if
their determination may have an important bearing on the outcome
of the antitrust proceeding.216 But the mere fact that the activity
may fall within other sections of the act should not, of itself, be
sufficient to stay the proceeding since virtually all treble damage
shipping cases may have potential Shipping Act issues, the resolution
of which by the Commission would not materially assist the court.
When the antitrust action seeks injunctive relief the Cunard and
214

Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. United States, 81 F Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1948),
appeal dismissed sub. noa., A/S J. Ludwig Mowmckels Reden v. Isbrandtsen Co., 336
U.S. 941 (1949).
215 Pennsylvania Motor Truck Ass'n v. Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal Ass'n,
183 F Supp. 910, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See United States Trucking Corp. v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 146 F Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). There the court acknowledged
that injunctive relief could be granted in such circumstances, but concluded that, on the
facts, the plaintiffs failed to prove either irreparable injury or a balance of the equities
in their favor. Id. at 926.
21o Maddock & Miller, Inc. v. United States Lines, 365 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1966).
See note 153 supra.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

Far East Conference decisions govern. Even if the court is able to
determine that the conduct has not been inmunized, an injunction
may still interfere with a subsequent determination by the Commision that the activity should be given prospective approval. Permanent injunctive remedy has been superseded by a section 22 complaint to determine the legality of the conduct under section 15, and,
if the activity is found unlawful and unapprovable, an enforcement
proceeding in a district court under section 29 may be filed if necessary Interim mjunctive relief in some situations may not interfere
with the agency's jurisdiction, and, just as in the cases in which courts
grant injunctive relief to maintain the status quo pending an agency
determination, a court could, upon an appropriate showing, restrain
the conduct pending the Commission's determination. However, even
where only interim injunctive relief is sought, the court should
consider whether the conduct is arguably within the scope of an
approved agreement. If so, there is a risk that the interim relief will
interfere with the agency's approval of the conduct, and mterim
relief should not be granted.
Where treble damage relief or the criminal or civil penalty provisions of the Shipping Act are sought to be enforced, there is less risk
of interference with the Commission's jurisdiction than in injunction
proceedings where the relief sought is prospective. Relief for past
conduct will not conflict with a subsequent agency determination,
and the right to obtain relief for past conduct under the antitrust
laws is therefore not displaced by the Shipping Act. Any accommodation must be by means of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. If the
conduct is of debatable legality, the proceedings must be stayed and
the issue referred to the Commission.
The doctrine is also applicable in non-antitrust cases. Here there
is no need for an accommodation between two statutory schemes, and
the doctrine's use is to promote uniformity in the regulation of the
industry, and to utilize the specialized competence of the Commission
to aid the judicial process. The question of whether the court or the
Commission is the appropriate tribunal to hear the controversy is in
some instances answered by the statute itself. Under sections 14 and
15, approval or disapproval of dual rate contracts and other agreements are matters for the Commission, not the courts. Where unjustly
discriminatory rates or unjust and unreasonable practices are found
under section 17, it is the Commission, and not the courts, which
must correct these conditions. Where rates in foreign commerce are
unreasonably high or low, the Commission has the duty to disapprove
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them under section 18. The courts are, however, expressly charged with
the duty to entertain criminal proceedings instituted to enforce the
crmnal provisions of sections 14 and 16, and civil actions to recover
penalties for violations of sections 14b, 15 and 18.
Where the act does not identify the appropriate tribunal, the
character of the wrong may suggest the answer. There are three general types of offenses covered by the Shipping Act. The first category
consists of specific acts which are prohibited. These offenses can be
established by direct proof, without the need for analysis. Examples
include determinations under section 18 of whether or not a carrier
has filed tariffs with the Commission or has assessed rates other than
those in his tariff, an ocean freight forwarder's failure to obtain a
license from the Commission as required by section 44, and the
giving and receiving of information to the detriment of a shipper,
consignee or carrier under section 20.
The second category of offenses consists of acts which are measured by standards purposely framed in general terms. This group includes discriminatory or unfair practices against shippers under
section 14 Third, unjust or unfair devices to grant or obtain transportation at non-tariff rates under section 16, unjust or unreasonable practices in the receiving and delivering of property under section 17,
and unjust or unreasonable rates under section 18. The terms "discrimnatory or unfaiZr", "unjust or unfair" and "unjust or unreasonable", are general terms and some degree of analysis is required
instead of merely a determination that a specific act was or was not
done.
The third category consists of conduct which, while discrimiatory, unfair or prejudicial, is not unlawful until it exceeds the maximum latitude permitted by the act. Section 14 Fourth prohibits
unjustly discriminatory contracts with shippers and unjust discrimiation against sippers in certain matters. Undue or unreasonable
preferences or prejudices against persons, localities or descriptions of
traffic are unlawful under section 16 First, and unjustly discriminatory
rates and charges are prohibited by section 17 Some activities may
therefore be discriminatory or prejudicial without violating the Shipping Act, but are unlawful when they become "unjustly", "unduly"
or "unreasonably" so. These are questions of degree and the tribunal
is given the discretion to determine whether, in view of the transportation conditions, the conduct is sufficiently harmful to be prohibited.
The Commission with its specialized knowledge of industry conditions is better equipped to resolve controversies charging offenses
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included in the third category Those in the first category, which do
not require analysis of the facts, are as amenable to adjudication by
the courts as the Commission. 217 The offenses included in the second
category require some degree of analysis and, while in the determination of their legality the tribunal is not given the same measure of
discretion as it is in adjudicating offenses falling within the third
category, the general nature of the standard to be applied indicates
that the resolution of controversies involving these offenses is better
left to the expertise of the Commission. This is compatible with the
decisions under the Interstate Commerce Act which apply the doctrine to activity measured by general standards such as the fairness
and reasonableness of rates, and tariff classifications, rules and practices.2i 8
Finally, the doctrine can be useful in the enforcement of civil
and crimial Shipping Act penalties. Where the unlawfulness of the
conduct has already been established or the conduct is not arguably
within an approved agreement, and the suit is only to collect the
fine or penalty, the doctrine has no purpose. But this should not rule
out the doctrine's application in appropriate situations in which
legality is in doubt. In a section 15 penalty action where the legality
of the defendant's conduct is in question, the same issue is present as
that in the antitrust cases; i.e., whether the activity constitutes the
implementation of an approved agreement. If it does, neither the
antitrust laws nor the section 15 penalty applies. In the non-sectaon 15
penalty or fine proceedings where the conduct has not been held
unlawful by the Commission and the nature of the controversy revolves the resolution of complex or techical questions, an initial
determination by the Commission would be of substantial benefit to
the court. In a suit to recover section 16 fines, for example, the issue
may be whether the conduct amounted to undue or unreasonable
prejudice against a particular person, locality or description of traffic.
Whether the prejudice has reached the point of being undue or unreasonable is something the Commission is better able to decide.
When the doctrine is applied in such enforcement proceedings
an initial determination of the legality of the activity under the
Shipping Act can be made by the Commission, and, if a violation is
217 See United States v. Stephens Bros. Line, 4 P & F Ship. Reg. Rep. 20,864
(S.D. Fla. 1966), an action by the Government seeking penalties for the alleged failure
to Mhe tariffs. The court considered the case on the merits and concluded that the defendant was not a common carrier by water and thus was not subject to tariff Mling requirements. Primary jurisdiction was not discussed.
218 See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
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found, the judicial proceedings may resume and the penalty or fine
recovered by the Government as contemplated by the act. In dealing
with practices as intricate and technical as many are in the shippmg
industry, the risk that some activity which to the court appears to
violate the Shipping Act with attendant crnnmnal penalties, may be
justified by transportation conditions, appears well worth the delay in
securing an adminstrative determination.

